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Shibboleths and Ceballos: Eroding Constitutional 
Rights Through Pseudocommunication 
Susan Stuart 
ABSTRACT 
Recently, the Supreme Court rendered an inexplicable First 
Amendment decision that has far-reaching effects on the way 
government is held accountable to the public. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
the Court determined that a government employer can retaliate 
against an employee for doing his job correctly, notwithstanding the 
Constitution, so long as the employer targets speech that was part of 
the employee’s official duties. Inasmuch as government employees 
are often responsible for reporting government misconduct and 
other matters of public concern, this opinion essentially leaves the 
public unprotected from the unbridled discretion of government 
supervisors. The possible motivations for this decision are several: the 
adoption of an increasingly popular management style that 
marginalizes employees; a free-market theory of governance that 
deregulates control of management; and, in actuality, the protection 
of current government supervisors from whistleblowers. All are 
symptomatic of the Court’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies. To 
make the Garcetti decision palatable, the Court majority disguised 
the fact that its holding was unsupported by the law by employing 
four basic rhetorical devices throughout the opinion: the Narrative 
(or Storytelling) voice, the Granfalloon voice, the Symbolic voice, 
and the Empty voice. All four voices have universal application so 
that, unfortunately, the Garcetti opinion is not an outlier but an 
instantiation of once and future cases. 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful 
tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor 
less.” 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean 
so many different things.” 
 
 Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. My heartfelt thanks to the 
superlative editing skills of Kenneth Pike and the staff of the BYU Law Review. 
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“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—
that’s all.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Humpty Dumpty refers to Lewis Carroll’s poem, Jabberwocky,2 
when he suggests that one who speaks is the master of his meaning. 
In the context of Lewis Carroll’s children’s story, Jabberwocky has no 
meaning, at least that an adult audience could discern. It is 
nonsensical because, although it contains recognizable words and 
phrases from the English language (“and,” “the,” “in the”), one gets 
tangled up in the unfamiliar lexemes, words and word stems like 
“brillig” and “slith.”3 Humpty Dumpty, as master of the words, 
translates some of the unfamiliar words for Alice,4 but the song still 
makes no sense. 
If one considers a writing court as “master” of the language in its 
decision, each “master” usually conforms to the jargon familiar to 
the legal audience. The common linking words may be recognizable 
to the general public while the lexemes in the opinion are familiar to 
the members of the trade, who can translate them into fairly simple 
English for the client. But in recent years, the Supreme Court is 
becoming more like Humpty Dumpty—master of the legal 
profession’s jargon, using familiar vocabulary and legal terms of the 
profession but reaching nonsensical results not otherwise conceived 
by precedent because the Court is changing the meanings of the 
 
 1. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND 
THERE 94 (Random House 1946) (1871). 
 2. The first stanza of Jabberwocky reads: 
‘Twas brillig and the slithy toves 
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe: 
All mimsy were the borogoves, 
And the mome raths outgrabe. 
Id. at 18. 
 3. YourDictionary.com, The Collected Works of the Phantom Linguist: But There Are 
No Such Things as Words!, http://www.yourdictionary.com/library/ling005.html (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
 4. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 95–97. A rough rendition of the first stanza of 
Jabberwocky is: 
It was evening, and the smooth active badgers 
were scratching and boring holes in the hill side 
the parrots were all unhappy 
and the solemn turtles shrieked. 
Sebastian Wren, Decoding and the Jabberwocky’s Song 1 (Sw. Educ. Dev. Lab.), 
http://www.sedl.org/reading/topics/jabberwocky.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
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words. The Court’s language makes the result seem palatable and 
even reasonable, but upon closer scrutiny, the words are really 
jabberwocky. 
Garcetti v. Ceballos5 is one of the more obvious examples of this 
jabberwocky by which the Court has, once and for all, deprived 
government employees of First Amendment6 protections while they 
are fulfilling their official duties. In trying to “diagnose” the 
discomfort one experiences when studying the opinion, one jumps 
from problem to problem, the amalgamation of which is not easily 
distilled into a particular study of language. However, the intent and 
purpose of this amalgamation of language problems is perhaps best 
described as pseudocommunication. 
Pseudocommunication is less about the symbolic transmission of 
the message—although that is ultimately affected—than it is about 
obfuscating the message and its intentions. Among the purposes of 
pseudocommunication are control of the message through secret 
knowledge and the imposition of unquestioned authority and 
obedience to that authority.7 Pseudocommunication may employ any 
number or combination of obfuscatory language choices—mainly 
deliberate—including doublespeak, euphemism, dysphemism, 
rhetorical manipulation, and misrepresentation. Pseudo-
communication has more to do with cant than with logic and 
analysis. It is about empty language to cover the absence of honest 
legal analysis. The majority decision in Garcetti exploited four 
distinct voices of pseudocommunication: the Narrative Voice, the 
Granfalloon Voice, the Symbolic Voice, and the Empty Voice. The 
irony in Garcetti is that the Court’s intent and its message are the 
same—the imposition of authority. As the opinion approves the 
imposition of power over public employee speech so also does the 
opinion caricaturize the imposition of the Court’s “master-y” over 
the language. Thus, Garcetti is an allegorical instance of the Court’s 
imposing authoritarian structure over our civil rights through 
pseudocommunication.8 
 
 5. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 7. See Terence P. Moran, Propaganda as Pseudocommunication, 36 ET CETERA 181, 
190, 193–94 (1979), available at http://learn-gs.org/library/etc/36-2-moran.pdf. 
 8. Remedying the problem may be well-nigh impossible short of submitting arguments 
to the Court where the parties have agreed on the definitions of the legal terms at issue. 
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The various techniques of pseudocommunication that the Court 
used to reach a result that cannot otherwise be rationalized by 
traditional legal analysis serve as the foundation for this Article’s 
structure. First, Part II of this Article examines the roots of 
pseudocommunication and its relationships to propaganda and to 
the law. Part III connects the political roots of pseudo-
communication to authoritarian governance, to which the Garcetti 
opinion paid particular homage. Part IV then sets out the 
infrastructure of the facts and analysis furnished by the majority 
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos as the basis for further exploration of 
the devices of pseudocommunication employed by the Court. The 
next sections explore the four major areas of the Court’s pseudo-
communication: Narrative Rhetoric, the storytelling function of the 
Court (Part V); Granfalloon Rhetoric, an “us versus them” political 
narrative (Part VI); Symbolic Rhetoric, the use of symbols to appeal 
to particular readers (Part VII); and Empty Rhetoric, the use of cant 
and doublespeak (Part VIII). Part IX discusses the ramifications of 
the Court’s decision for supporting government efforts to stifle 
critical speech. 
II. PSEUDOCOMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 
Pseudocommunication in the context of this Article is a broad 
umbrella covering various semantic and rhetorical devices used by 
lawyers and by courts to persuade others that an unpalatable (and 
often wrong) result is just and right and good. Here, pseudo-
communication does not refer to the lawyer’s craft and trade—the 
use of rhetoric and language to persuade. Instead, pseudo-
communication is a mutation of persuasive lawyering into something 
more insidious: the deliberate manipulation of language under the 
guise of legal precision to persuade an audience that a gross error in 
judgment is perfectly acceptable, where all notions of honesty are 
stripped from the legal purpose by manipulating the tools of the 
language. In other words, pseudocommunication is the technique of 
selling a product no one wants, not through persuasive lawyering but 
through Madison Avenue shilling. 
Pseudocommunication has its philosophical roots in propaganda. 
Indeed, it is propaganda. “Propaganda” means the dissemination or 
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promotion of ideas.9 There is no denying that the act of advocacy is 
an act of persuasion akin to propaganda, the skill of image-making 
and image-projecting.10 But despite the fact that they may be distant 
cousins on the same family tree, there is one major distinction 
between pseudocommunication as propaganda and legal advocacy as 
persuasion, and that distinction lies in the speaker’s purpose relative 
to the recipient. 
On the one hand, persuasion is “a communicative process the 
purpose of which is to influence.”11 Persuasion relies on the 
dependency of the persuader on the persuadee in a reciprocal 
transaction of communication. Persuasion is “a complex, continuing, 
interactive process in which a sender and a receiver are linked by 
symbols, verbal and nonverbal, through which the persuader 
attempts to influence the persuadee to adopt a change in a given 
attitude or behavior because the persuadee has had perceptions 
enlarged or changed.”12 This sender-recipient relationship describes 
the role of the traditional lawyer-advocate: both written and oral 
communications are aimed at getting the decisionmaker to rule in 
favor of one side or the other, and the decisionmaker is persuaded as 
a result of that transactional activity to reach a decision for one side 
or the other. In a democratic setting, persuasion can be messy and 
unpredictable, spontaneous and decentralized,13 but it is not as 
dishonestly manipulative as propaganda. 
Propaganda goes farther than persuasion in influencing the 
recipient with a much different goal and process; it “is the deliberate 
and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, 
and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired 
intent of the propagandist.”14 Where persuasion informs, propaganda 
deceives. “The means may vary from a mild slanting of information 
to outright deception, but the ends are always predetermined in 
 
 9. GARTH S. JOWETT & VICTORIA O’DONNELL, PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION 15 
(1986) (“[‘Propaganda’] is from Latin—‘congregation de propaganda fide’—meaning 
congregation for propagating the faith of the Roman Catholic Church.”). 
 10. Moran, supra note 7, at 182. 
 11. JOWETT & O’DONNELL, supra note 9, at 24. 
 12. Id. (quoting VICTORIA O’DONNELL AND JUNE KABLE, PERSUASION: AN 
INTERACTIVE-DEPENDENCY APPROACH 9 (1982)). 
 13. See JONATHAN SCHELL, THE TIME OF ILLUSION 371 (1976); Moran, supra note 7, 
at 182. 
 14. JOWETT & O’DONNELL, supra note 9, at 16 (emphasis omitted). 
STUART.FIN 9/29/2008 8:38:46 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
1550 
favor of the propagandist.”15 Persuasion is an effort to address 
individual psychological behavior whereas propaganda is designed to 
manipulate societal behavior and its patterns.16 Jowett and 
O’Donnell define “propaganda” as the promotion of “a partisan or 
competitive cause in the best interest of the propagandist but not 
necessarily in the best interest of the recipient. The recipient, 
however, may believe that the communication is merely 
informative.”17  
Pseudocommunication is a useful, if not the principal, tool of 
propagandists. The characteristics and purposes of pseudo-
communication are: 
1) The sender maintains control and determines the meaning of 
the message and limits the effectiveness of feedback.  
2) The sender’s control of the analysis results in the Stated and 
Observed Purposes being different and often contradictory 
because the sender’s stated purposes are often deliberately 
hidden, unclear, and not empirically verifiable. 
3) The sender’s control of the analysis as well as the flow of 
information encourages collective and non-critical thinking 
by the receiver.  
4) The sender’s symbol system confuses symbols and signs and 
encourages ambiguous interpretation by implying, without 
establishing, close relationships between symbols and their 
referents.  
5) The sender’s appeals make emotional connections between 
the receiver and the message.  
6) The sender bases his justification for the message on private 
and unknowable sources, such as outside authorities, inside 
information, secret knowledge, and mystical revelation.  
 
 15. Id. at 19–20. 
 16. Id. at 21, 36. 
 17. Id. at 23. Three types of propaganda have been described: white propaganda occurs 
when the source of the propaganda is identified and the message is accurate but the process of 
communication is designed to enhance the “good-guy” status of the source; gray propaganda 
occurs when the source may or may not be identified and the information may or may not be 
accurate; and black propaganda, also known as disinformation, occurs when the source is false 
and the information contains lies and deceptions. Id. at 17–18. One type of propaganda—
white propaganda—even seems informational because the identifiable speaker imparts accurate 
information. However, white propaganda has a partisan agenda or there would have been no 
communication. Similar techniques of appearing informative infect gray propaganda (may be 
accurate) and black propaganda (not accurate). Id. at 23. 
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7) The sender believes that the ends justify the means, which are 
value-free and above criticism.  
8) The sender analyzes the universe with certainty and reduces 
that analysis to a simple word, phrase, or slogan. 
9) The sender encourages the receiver to avoid responsibility 
because, alternately, the responsibility is someone else’s or 
the receiver is acting on behalf of a higher authority.  
10) The sender tells the receiver that an outside, evil force is 
causing disorganization and misunderstanding and that no 
amount of intelligence will overcome its continually changing 
tactics.18 
Pseudocommunication tampers with reality. Consequently, 
pseudocommunication requires reflecting not only on the symbols 
used for the communication itself but the context and the structure 
of the message, which is intended to appeal to emotions rather than 
to rationality,19 hence its close affiliation with propaganda. 
Not all pseudocommunication is propaganda; pseudo-
communication is also the backbone of bureaucratic communications 
and mass media. But the psychological goal of propaganda is the 
psychological goal of pseudocommunication—to manipulate reality 
for the benefit of the speaker. When the government uses pseudo-
communication, one remembers Orwell’s fictional classic 1984 and 
the principle of doublethink.20 Big Brother’s doublespeak for 
converting citizens like Winston Smith to orthodoxy—“war is peace” 
 
 18. Moran, supra note 7, at 184–95 (referring to all ten characteristics and purposes of 
pseudocommunication). 
 19. Id. at 182–83. 
 20. Orwell described doublethink as follows: 
Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind 
simultaneously, and accepting both of them. The Party intellectual knows in which 
direction his memories must be altered; he therefore knows that he is playing tricks 
with reality; but by the exercise of doublethink he also satisfies himself that reality is 
not violated. The process has to be conscious, or it would not be carried out with 
sufficient precision, but it also has to be unconscious, or it would bring with it a 
feeling of falsity and hence of guilt. . . . To tell deliberate lies while genuinely 
believing in them, to forget any fact that has become inconvenient, and then, when 
it becomes necessary again, to draw it back from oblivion for just so long as it is 
needed to deny the existence of objective reality and all the while to take account of 
the reality which one denies—all this is indispensably necessary. Even in using the 
word doublethink it is necessary to exercise doublethink. For by using the word one 
admits that one is tampering with reality; by a fresh act of doublethink one erases this 
knowledge; and so on indefinitely, with the lie always one leap ahead of the truth. 
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 214 (Penguin Books 1977) (1949). 
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and “freedom is slavery”—is the use of pseudocommunication for 
government purposes.21 If a court’s decisions are a government 
function, then pseudocommunication can be its servant as surely as 
Big Brother’s. 
As a necessary component of pseudocommunication, a court 
opinion is clearly one-sided. Control is in the court as sender, not in 
the recipients. The recipients, if consulted at all, are being 
manipulated to a particular mindset dependent upon the language 
choices and definitions selected by the court. The higher the court, 
the greater the temptation to use and abuse pseudocommunication. 
This “imposed system” limits the recipients’ feedback, even assuming 
that the court would consider feedback. Once the briefs are filed and 
oral arguments heard, it is the rare court that will respond to a 
petition for rehearing. Indeed, a court’s opinion is a more natural 
source of pseudocommunication than other forms of legal 
communication because a court controls the ultimate message and 
intends to affect the recipients, including the lawyers and the public. 
But the increasingly common use of pseudocommunication in 
current legal discourse is troubling not only for its effect on a 
particular case but for future cases.22 
III. THE POLITICS OF PSEUDOCOMMUNICATION 
This aspect of a court’s control over the message is, underlying 
everything else, the imposition of authority over the audience. The 
notion is that the sender holds the power and intends to consolidate 
if not spread that power through the message. Orwell’s 1984, of 
course, was an extreme example of pseudocommunication to exert 
control under the most extreme of governmental formulæ, 
totalitarianism. Today, pseudocommunication in the name of the law 
is being deployed increasingly in the name, not of Orwell’s 
totalitarianism, but of authoritarianism. 
“Authoritarianism” has been defined in two ways: 
“unquestioning obedience to authority” and “obedience combined 
with the use of authority to repress, punish and oppress human 
 
 21. See generally Terence P. Moran, Public Doublespeak: On Communication and 
Pseudocommunication, 36 C. ENG. 112 (1974). 
 22. See generally Judith D. Fischer, Why George Orwell’s Ideas About Language Still 
Matter for Lawyers, 68 MONT. L. REV. 129 (2007). 
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beings.”23 The authoritarianism most likely encountered in today’s 
legal discourse is substantive authoritarianism, which “means 
opposition to the ‘liberal’ values of tolerance of ambiguity and 
difference, insistence on obedience to rules, insistence on 
conformity, and use of coercion and punishment to ensure that 
obedience.”24 Such authoritarianism may have no other impetus than 
“a suspicious and distrustful view of human nature and is frequently 
linked, both on a personal and political level, to . . . patriarchy [and] 
oppresses in the name of order and control.”25 
Authoritarianism is not necessarily bad, insofar as there is a 
benign authority that demands obedience to a system that safeguards 
liberty at the expense of minimal loss of personal freedoms.26 But 
when the authoritarian system becomes more negative and seeks 
absolute obedience, it deprives certain freedoms absolutely and 
employs power to oppress and sanction, tending more toward 
repressive authoritarianism.27 These “[a]uthoritarians obey and 
demand obedience to authority’s commands simply because they are 
commands, and they hold a harshly punitive attitude toward those 
who do not comply.”28 
In recent years, “authoritarianism”—in both followers and 
leaders29—has become uncomfortably aligned with conservative 
political movements, often denoted and studied separately as “right-
wing authoritarianism.”30 Characteristics of right-wing 
authoritarianism include: 
 
 23. Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379, 390 
(1991). 
 24. Id. at 382. 
 25. Id. 
 26. STANLEY MILGRIM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 179 
(2004) (“[T]he problem is not ‘authoritarianism’ as a mode of political organization or a set of 
psychological attitudes but authority itself. Authoritarianism may give way to democratic 
practice, but authority itself cannot be eliminated as long as society is to continue in the form 
we know.”). 
 27. See Henderson, supra note 23, at 390–92. 
 28. Id. at 394. 
 29. BOB ALTEMEYER, THE AUTHORITARIANS 2 (2007), available at http://www. 
theauthoritarians.com/. “Authoritarianism is something authoritarian followers and 
authoritarian leaders cook up between themselves. It happens when the followers submit too 
much to the leaders, trust them too much, and give them too much leeway to do whatever 
they want—which often is something undemocratic, tyrannical and brutal.” Id.  
 30. BOB ALTEMEYER, THE AUTHORITARIAN SPECTER 6 (1996). 
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1) Authoritarian submission—a high degree of submission to the 
authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in 
the society in which one lives. 
2) Authoritarian aggression—a general aggressiveness, directed against 
various persons, that is perceived to be sanctioned by established 
authorities. 
3) Conventionalism—a high degree of adherence to the social 
conventions that are perceived to be endorsed by society and its 
established authorities.31 
Leaders of right-wing authoritarian groups tend to exhibit 
weaker authoritarian characteristics, although they do share certain 
of their followers’ prejudices and conservative economic 
philosophies.32 As “social dominators,” authoritarian leaders believe 
less in some cause or creed than in gaining power through any means 
necessary.33 And “[w]hen social dominators are in the driver’s seat, 
and right-wing authoritarians stand at their beck and call, unethical 
things appear much more likely to happen.”34 
Those who embrace authoritarian leaders’ messages possess 
characteristics that make them prone to following social dominators. 
Specifically, they have difficulty accurately remembering evidence, 
making correct inferences in critical reasoning, and recognizing false 
inferences.35 They are also “suckers for slogans and sayings.”36 They 
tend to “see the world as a more dangerous place than most others 
do, with civilization on the verge of collapse and the world of Mad 
Max looming just beyond” in their over-exaggeration of the 
importance of social problems.37 Right-wing authoritarians tend to 
scrutinize more critically the evidence underlying conclusions with 
which they disagree than the evidence of principles they want to 
believe.38 Such authoritarians also tend to have higher credulity when 
 
 31. Id. Given the voting majority in Garcetti—Justices Kennedy (writing), Scalia, 
Thomas, Roberts, Alito—right-wing authoritarianism seems the more appropriate attribute 
than liberal authoritarianism. BOB ALTEMEYER, ENEMIES OF FREEDOM: UNDERSTANDING 
RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM 230–31 (1988). 
 32. See ALTEMEYER, supra note 29, at 162. 
 33. Id. at 170. 
 34. Id. at 176. 
 35. See ALTEMEYER, supra note 30, at 94–95. 
 36. Id. at 99. 
 37. Id. at 100. 
 38. Id. at 101. 
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it comes to making attributions to groups of which they are 
members than in disbelieving the stereotypes of those groups, 
thereby making such authoritarians more gullible when a speaker 
validates their views.39 
As for their political viewpoints, right-wing authoritarians tend 
not to embrace “freedom of speech, freedom of opportunity, the 
right to due process, the principle that no one is above the law, 
tolerance of others, [and] blind and impartial justice.”40 
Concomitantly, authoritarians tend to agree with statements like: 
“[t]his country would be better off if we cared less about how equal 
all people are”; “[s]ome groups of people are simply not the equals 
of others”; and “[s]ome people are just more worthy than others.”41 
Thus, the current authoritarian strain in the American political 
landscape has six primary features: 1) a cult of anti-modernism and 
cultural traditionalism that harkens to the nineteenth century and the 
robber barons;42 2) the diminution of democratic public spaces in 
direct correlation to the corporatization of civil society;43 3) rampant 
nationalism that weds patriotism with a culture of fear;44 4) attempts 
to control mass media through the coordination of government 
regulation and corporate cronies;45 5) the eradication of the church-
state dichotomy simultaneously with the increasing use of religious 
rhetoric in political dialogue and policy;46 and 6) the increased use of 
Orwellian doublespeak as official government language.47 
Such substantive authoritarianism is infecting the judiciary.48 Of 
course, a certain amount of authoritarianism in the judiciary is 
necessary to “force” people to obey and accept the premise of the 
rule of law. However, that judicial power can become twisted when 
it is the servant of substantive authoritarianism rather than merely an 
authoritarian influence of the social and political power of a 
 
 39. See id. at 111. 
 40. ALTEMEYER, supra note 31, at 273. 
 41. ALTEMEYER, supra note 29, at 160. 
 42. Henry A. Giroux, The Emerging Authoritarianism in the United States: Political 
Culture under the Bush/Cheney Administration, 14 SYMPLOKĒ 98, 104 (2006). Giroux calls the 
current U.S. political authoritarianism “proto-fascism.” Id. at 102. 
 43. Id. at 104. 
 44. Id. at 106. 
 45. Id. at 107. 
 46. Id. at 114. 
 47. Id. at 110. 
 48. See Henderson, supra note 23, at 434–47. 
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government.49 The Supreme Court has been documented specifically 
as doing its part to carry on this substantive authoritarian tradition: 
Rather than being conservative in the sense of caution and respect 
for tradition, much of the Court’s language and many of its 
decisions provide evidence of a substantively authoritarian attitude 
on the part of many members of the Court. The Court has 
variously justified its decisions as deference to state authorities, 
obedience to legal commands and support of majoritarianism. The 
Court has also engaged in nativist, suspicious and stereotypical 
reasoning. Prejudice and punitiveness are frequently subtextual, if 
not immediately obvious, in the Court’s opinions. Along the way, 
the Court has enhanced the power of government to command, to 
punish, to control, and to ignore social wrongs. It has also 
diminished the power of individuals and governments—state and 
federal—to attempt to correct the evils of subordination and 
oppression.50 
One of the instruments designed to make palatable this toxic 
brew of feigned traditional conservative jurisprudence and increased 
governmental oppression is not just the Court’s viewpoint, but its 
use of pseudocommunication. 
Previously described features of pseudocommunication that serve 
this substantive authoritarianism include: 
1) The sender maintains control and determines the meaning of 
the message and limits the effectiveness of feedback. 
9) The sender encourages the receiver to avoid responsibility 
because, alternately, the responsibility is someone else’s or 
the receiver is acting on behalf of a higher authority. 
10) The sender tells the receiver that an outside, evil force is 
causing disorganization and misunderstanding and that no 
amount of intelligence will overcome its continually changing 
tactics. 
 
 49. See id. at 383. As substantive authoritarianism infects the ordinarily authoritarian 
nature of the law and perverts it to the goal of “obedience to positive law and rules and takes a 
punitive or moralistic stance against deviance,” it forms a “jurisprudence of dominance and 
punishment towards those who are different or deviant.” Id. at 410. An emerging body of 
scholarship propounds that substantive authoritarianism is a positive good in jurisprudence. 
Such scholarship “not only emphasizes obedience to law but also manifests distrust of judges, 
insistence on an absolute severance between concern for positive law and justice, and a singular 
lack of concern with the continuing oppression of individuals.” Id. at 411. 
 50. Id. at 435–36 (footnotes omitted). 
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Obviously, a very thin line divides judicial decision making—a 
task the Constitution has given in trust to the Court—and imperial 
exhortation. The trick in making the latter work for the Court is 
forcing the recipient to believe in the fairness of the decision and not 
question its sources or its fundamental reasoning. In Garcetti (an 
allegory for other cases), the Court employs pseudocommunication 
to further its authoritarian intentions under the guise of judicial 
decision making. 
IV. GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS: THE OPINION 
A. The Story According to the Court 
In early 2000, Richard Ceballos was a Deputy District Attorney 
for the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office. He worked 
out of the Pomona branch office as a calendar attorney with 
responsibilities that included supervising other attorneys in the 
office, preparing filings in pending cases, and investigating charges.51 
In February, a defense attorney on a pending case notified Ceballos 
that he had filed a motion to challenge the search warrant—a motion 
to traverse—because of concerns about inaccuracies in the affidavit 
underlying that warrant.52 He also requested that Ceballos review the 
case, a usual request of calendar deputies.53 
Ceballos’ review of the case gave him pause: he determined that 
the affiant had made serious misrepresentations.54 After speaking 
with the affiant deputy sheriff, Ceballos became particularly 
concerned about the affidavit’s representations that tire tracks were 
apparent on a particular roadway, the composition of which would 
have made it virtually impossible for tire tracks to be detected.55 
Concerned enough about the validity of the case to take further 
action, Ceballos discussed his concerns with Frank Sunstedt (then-
Head Deputy District Attorney) and Carol Najera, Ceballos’ 
immediate supervisor.56 Ceballos then drafted a follow-up 
 
 51. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413, 422 (2006). 
 52. Id. at 413–14. 
 53. Id. at 414. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.; Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV0011106AHMAJWX, 2002 WL 34098285, at *1–
2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002), rev’d, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 410 
(2006). 
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memorandum to Sunstedt, expressing his concerns about the case 
and recommending its dismissal.57 Drafting such a disposition 
memorandum was common in Ceballos’ job, and Ceballos wrote it 
pursuant to his duties as a prosecutor.58 A meeting was then 
conducted about the affidavit among Ceballos, Sunstedt, Najera, and 
several representatives of the sheriff’s department, including the 
affiant deputy.59 Apparently, that meeting grew heated, and one of 
the sheriff’s representatives criticized Ceballos’ handling of the 
matter.60 Following the meeting, Sunstedt decided to proceed with 
the prosecution of the case.61 
The defense counsel called Ceballos to testify at the hearing on 
the motion to traverse, at which he testified to his concerns about 
the affidavit.62 The trial court denied the defense’s motion.63 
Thereafter, Ceballos claimed the district attorney’s office retaliated 
against him with various adverse employment actions: reassignment 
as a trial deputy, transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a 
promotion.64 Ceballos filed suit against Gil Garcetti (then-District 
Attorney of Los Angeles County) in his individual and official 
capacities, Najera and Sunstedt in their individual capacities, and the 
County of Los Angeles.65 Ceballos based his § 1983 cause of action 
on the defendants’ violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights in “the aftermath of these events.”66 Ultimately, Ceballos’ 
memorandum was the only issue that reached the Ninth Circuit, 
which determined that the First Amendment protected Ceballos’ 
speech as a matter of public concern.67 
 
 57. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414. Ceballos also apparently submitted a second 
memorandum reflecting his conversation with the affiant deputy sheriff, but only the Supreme 
Court noted that memorandum. Id.; see Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at *4, Garcetti, 547 
U.S. 410 (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 190354. 
 58. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
 59. Id. at 414. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 414–15. 
 63. Id. at 415. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 410 
(2006). 
 66. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 415. 
 67. Id. at 416. The district court granted the defense’s motion for summary judgment 
on the § 1983 First Amendment claim and dismissed the state law claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV0011106AHMAJWX, 2002 WL 
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B. The Majority’s Decision 
In Garcetti, the Court essentially asserted that government 
employees have no First Amendment rights if they speak pursuant to 
their employment duties.68 They might be protected if they speak as 
citizens, but if they speak while engaged in duties imposed by their 
jobs, they are not protected.69 The way the majority reached and 
justified its decision after decades of protecting the First Amendment 
rights of public employees is a classic example of using 
pseudocommunication for the benefit of authoritarianism because it 
expanded the power of government managers to command, control, 
and punish their employees without regard to the harm such power 
will inflict on the government function itself. 
Justice Kennedy starts the majority decision with the precedential 
context that gave public employees First Amendment protections, 
and prefaces that context by expansively noting that public 
employees do not surrender their First Amendment rights at the 
gates of their employment office.70 Rather, the government 
employee has the right—in certain circumstances—to address 
matters of public concern in her capacity as a citizen without fear of 
government retaliation.71 The majority decision then traced the route 
that overturned the “dogma . . . that a public employee had no right 
to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment—
including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional 
rights.”72 Beginning with Pickering v. Board of Education of Township 
 
34098285, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002), rev’d, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 
U.S. 410 (2006). The county defendants prevailed on summary judgment under Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity while the individual defendants prevailed under qualified 
immunity. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1172, rev’d, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the county defendants 
were not covered by the Eleventh Amendment’s sovereign immunity because the district 
attorney and hence his office were acting in a county capacity, a political subdivision of the 
state. Id. at 1170. Furthermore, the individual defendants were not entitled to qualified 
immunity under the First Amendment because of the public concern addressed by Ceballos’ 
speech and his interest in the speech overbore the interest of the government in the efficient 
and nondisruptive running of the government office. Id. With the memorandum the only 
matter that the Ninth Circuit addressed, the remainder of Ceballos’ speech issues remained for 
trial. Id. at 1172–73. 
 68. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
 69. Id. at 423. 
 70. See id. at 417. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)). 
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High School District 205,73 the majority traced the balancing act it 
had created between the interests of the employer government and 
the constitutional rights of its employees.74 The Garcetti Court then 
set out the test that had ostensibly arisen from Pickering and its 
progeny that would determine the constitutional protection afforded 
to government employee speech from government employer 
retaliation: 1) determine if the employee spoke as a citizen on a 
matter of public concern; 2) if yes, determine if the government 
employer was justified in treating the government employee 
differently from the general public; in other words, was the adverse 
employment action (or punishment) legally justified.75 That the 
government, as employer, has broader powers over its employees 
than over the general public is immutable, asserted the majority.76 
And citizens who become government employees must necessarily 
accept this limit to their freedom.77 This freedom is not as 
“balanced” as envisioned by Pickering, but is under a “significant 
degree of control [because] without [significant control], there 
would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.”78 
The Court then addressed the counterpoise of the Pickering 
balancing test: the government may not impinge on its employees’ 
fundamental rights as private citizens. Thus, the majority 
acknowledged the limitation that the government cannot restrict 
employees’ speech when they are acting as citizens on matters of 
public concern unless such speech affects the efficient operation of 
the job.79 The majority lauded the efforts of government employees 
to engage in civic discussion, which is necessary “for informed, 
vibrant dialogue in a democratic society,”80 but cautioned that 
 
 73. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, at 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 74. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417. In Pickering, it was the “balance between the interests of 
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.” Id. (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). 
 75. Id. at 418. The policy for differentiating public employees from other citizens 
“reflect[s] the importance of the relationship between the speaker’s expressions and 
employment. A government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its 
role as employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has some 
potential to affect the entity’s operations.” Id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 419. 
 80. Id. 
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government employees may not “constitutionalize the employee 
grievance.”81 From this relatively clear explication of the Pickering 
balancing test, the majority then proceeded to do something 
radically different to Ceballos than what it did to Marvin Pickering. 
Although the First Amendment may protect internal speech and 
speech that concerns the subject of the government job, “[t]he 
controlling factor in Ceballos’ case [was] that his expressions were 
made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.”82 This fact alone 
distinguished Ceballos’ case from those in which the First 
Amendment protects from retaliation: “We hold that when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”83 Ceballos was required 
to write the memo as part of his official duties; hence, his employer 
had the right to restrict his speech because that speech was not 
possible but for his job. Such restriction on speech “does not 
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private 
citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what 
the employer itself has commissioned or created.”84 Pickering’s letter 
to the editor, in contrast, “had no official significance and bore 
similarities to letters submitted by numerous citizens every day.”85 
Indeed, Justice Kennedy characterized Ceballos’ work-product as 
government speech, bought and paid for by the government, and 
therefore a message it had the absolute right to control.86 
The bewildering lack of legal analysis in Garcetti evidences 
pseudocommunication. The decision really lacks anything else of 
legal significance. No logical connection with precedent suggests this 
result, which essentially subordinates speech to the employment 
status of the speaker.87 In the absence of legal analysis, one might 
infer that this decision was implicitly impelled by some of the facts: 
Ceballos’ memorandum created an uproar in a meeting with the 
 
 81. Id. at 420 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)). 
 82. Id. at 421. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 421–22. 
 85. Id. at 422. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A 
Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 573–75 (2008). 
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sheriff’s department, and therefore its interference with the 
government function justified his discipline under Pickering.88 That 
inference would stand if the majority had actually applied the 
Pickering inquiry as to whether Ceballos’ memorandum interfered 
with the efficient operation of the district attorney’s office. That 
inquiry would also stand if the facts were as the Supreme Court 
decision stated them. The absence of significant legal analysis—even 
a simplistic analogy to precedent—is pseudocommunication’s 
characteristic (2): the sender’s control of the analysis results in the 
stated and observed purposes being different and often contradictory 
because the sender’s stated purposes are often deliberately hidden, 
unclear, and not empirically verifiable. 
A more thorough examination of the Court’s techniques 
illuminates the substitution of pseudocommunication for legal 
analysis. 
V. THE NARRATIVE RHETORIC 
Facts and descriptive statements do not need to agree in order to 
have effective pseudocommunication.89 Indeed, facts are specifically 
sacrificed for the message in effective pseudocommunication. In an 
authoritarian’s view, facts must be discarded or manipulated so as to 
inflate the world’s problems into exceedingly dangerous events. 
Consequently, if one must justify clubbing baby seals over the head, 
it is better to pretend that one is saving civilization from killer whales 
by eliminating one of their food sources. That is rather the sort of 
narrative the majority devised to justify its decision that the First 
Amendment did not protect Ceballos’ acts. 
The evidence of any particular case is drawn up in a factual 
narrative—the court’s storytelling function.90 The facts from the 
immediate story constitute the “local narrative,”91 which becomes 
prominent in the historical continuity of the problem or area of 
 
 88. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414–18. 
 89. Hugh Rank, Watergate and the Language, in LANGUAGE AND PUBLIC POLICY 2, 3 
(Hugh Rank ed., NCTE 1974) (“The question is not just whether subjects and verbs agree, 
but whether statements and facts agree.” (quoting Robert Hogan, former Executive Secretary 
of the National Council of Teachers of English)). 
 90. Mary Ellen Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme Court’s 
Rhetoric and Its Constitutive Effects on Employment Discrimination Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 
1, 7 (1998). 
 91. David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2152, 2152 (1989). 
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law.92 The narrative is composed of the evidence presented by the 
parties and is appropriate for the procedural posture before the 
court: evidence at trial is presented and reviewed in one way while 
evidence in a motion for summary judgment is presented and 
weighed in another. 
The narrative in Garcetti is the context of a motion for summary 
judgment, a test of the evidence that focuses on the undisputed facts 
material to the controversy.93 A court will not grant summary 
judgment if the dispute of facts is sufficiently “genuine” that a 
reasonable jury could rule for the nonmovant.94 A court should not, 
however, change the focus of what a reasonable jury might do—or 
even a reasonable court at trial to the bench—by eliminating material 
undisputed facts entirely. Whether a dispute is genuine is a function 
of the materiality of the fact. Material facts are those “facts that 
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law [and] 
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”95 It is possible 
for different courts to make different determinations of a fact’s 
material nature. However, it is more than passing strange that the 
other two courts in the Garcetti saga employed a slightly different 
version of the facts than the Supreme Court. 
Generally, the narrative voice a court uses to assemble the 
evidence in a case is a rhetorical device that selects the facts that will 
ground a judicial opinion in the progression of law on an issue.96 
This function allows the author to shape the story, especially to 
convince the audience of the rightness of the ultimate legal 
conclusion in the case. The vision of the past created by the author 
should lead ineluctably to a decision that is sensible in the context of 
the version of the facts cast by the author.97 Any good advocate 
knows the power of casting the most favorable light on the facts, 
indeed “interpreting” the record.98 However, the Garcetti Court did 
not merely interpret the record, it reinvented the record. 
 
 92. See generally id. at 2152–53 (discussing how the “local narrative” relates to the way 
in which a case is remembered). 
 93. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 94. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l 
Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Maatman, supra note 90, at 8. 
 97. Luban, supra note 91, at 2153–54; Maatman, supra note 90, at 7. 
 98. Luban, supra note 91, at 2155. 
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The chief mechanism by which the majority’s decision engaged 
in pseudocommunication and thereby controlled the message was 
through omission—a “language problem . . . [that is] a more subtle 
kind of lying and deception than the ‘active’ aggressive untruths we 
normally recognize as lies.”99 Such rhetorical device is one of several 
employed for strategic reasons, such as “strategies of silence, the 
tactics of omission, evasion, diversion, circumlocution.”100 These 
devices are deliberately used and intended to persuade, even 
manipulate, the audience into believing certain stories and analyses. 
The majority omitted material facts that, if included in the opinion, 
would have at least made the opinion less persuasive.101 At most, the 
omitted facts expose the decision as illogical. 
While the Court is entitled to include background facts not 
material to the decision in order to persuade its audience, there is a 
limit to this freedom. A summary judgment is adjudged by reviewing 
the facts most favorable to the nonmovant.102 When a court omits 
those undisputed, material facts, it has transformed from persuader 
of the audience to the de facto advocate for the movant. Thus, its 
decisions go from persuasion to pseudocommunication, influenced 
by pseudocommunication characteristic number (7) where the 
sender believes that the ends justify the means, which are value-free 
and above criticism. 
The majority’s selective use of the undisputed facts was, in large 
measure, driven by its need to justify its new constitutional principle 
of depriving government employees their First Amendment rights. 
Without factual justification, the majority would not have been able 
to persuade its audience of the rationality of the decision. In so 
doing, the Court heeded the third and fifth characteristics of 
pseudocommunication: (3) the sender’s control of the analysis as 
well as the flow of information encourages collective and non-critical 
thinking by the receiver; and (5) appeals are directed toward the 
emotional, with an emphasis on finding emotional connections 
between the receiver and the message. So long as the majority’s facts 
can justify viewing Ceballos as a troublesome, or even bad, 
 
 99. Rank, supra note 89, at 4. 
 100. Id. at 10. 
 101. See generally Robert Batey, Parker v. Levy: A Primer on Judicial Persuasion, 49 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 97, 99–103 (1999). This essay examined Justice Rehnquist’s “manipulation of 
[the] facts to inculcate support for his side of the argument” in a particular opinion. Id. at 98. 
 102. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 
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government employee, then the majority’s decision is emotionally 
justified.103 
Notwithstanding its power to persuade through the narrative 
voice, the majority’s manipulation of the undisputed facts 
transgressed both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Court’s own proposition that the substantive law governs the 
materiality and relevancy of the facts in a motion for summary 
judgment.104 These rules and precedent do not suggest that the 
Court itself determines the materiality and relevancy of such facts for 
some other, political purpose. Several undisputed facts, omitted from 
Garcetti and most favorable to the non-movant, would have told a 
different story wholly unsympathetic to the government and to the 
Court’s ruling. Extrapolating those omitted, undisputed facts into 
the bleak narrative voice in Part IV above creates a different narrative 
voice: 
 In early 2000, Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney 
for the State of California, working for Gil Garcetti, District 
Attorney for Los Angeles County. He worked out of the Pomona 
branch office as a calendar attorney with responsibilities that 
included supervising other attorneys in the office, preparing filings 
in pending cases, and investigating charges. In February, a defense 
attorney on a pending case notified Ceballos that he had filed a 
motion to challenge the search warrant—a motion to traverse—in 
the case because of concerns about inaccuracies in the affidavit 
underlying that warrant. He also requested that Ceballos review the 
case, not an unusual request of calendar deputies. 
 Ceballos’ review of the case gave him pause: he determined that 
the affiant had made serious misrepresentations. After a thorough 
investigation that included a visit to the crime scene105 and speaking 
with the affiant deputy sheriff, Ceballos became particularly 
concerned about the affidavit’s representations that tire tracks were 
apparent on a particular roadway, the composition of which would 
have made it virtually impossible for tire tracks to be detected. At a 
minimum, Ceballos determined that the arresting deputies had grossly 
 
 103. But the Court’s characterization also had to be benign enough so that thousands 
upon thousands of government employees—troublesome or not—would forfeit important 
constitutional rights merely by being employed by the government. 
 104. Cf. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. 
 105. Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV0011106AHMAJWX, 2002 WL 34098285, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002), rev’d, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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misrepresented the truth.106 This misrepresentation was particularly 
vexing in the context of the scrutiny for serious misconduct under 
which southern California law enforcement agencies were operating 
at the time.107 
 Concerned enough about the validity of the case to take further 
action, Ceballos discussed his concerns with Frank Sunstedt (then-
Head Deputy District Attorney) and Carol Najera, Ceballos’ 
immediate supervisor. “Everyone agreed that the validity of the 
warrant was questionable.”108 Ceballos then drafted a follow-up 
memorandum to Sunstedt, expressing his concerns about the case 
and recommending its dismissal. Drafting such a disposition 
memorandum was common in Ceballos’ job, and Ceballos wrote it 
pursuant to his duties as a prosecutor. Sunstedt was concerned about 
the accusatory tone of the memo and instructed Ceballos to revise it; 
Ceballos did so.109 A meeting was then conducted about the 
affidavit among Ceballos, Sunstedt, Najera, and several 
representatives of the sheriff’s department, including the affiant 
deputy. Apparently, that meeting grew heated, and one of the 
sheriff’s department representatives present criticized Ceballos’ 
handling of the matter. As a consequence of the meeting, Sunstedt 
decided to proceed with the prosecution of the case. 
 After Sunstedt’s decision to proceed with the prosecution, Ceballos 
advised defense counsel of his concerns that certain statements in the 
warrant’s affidavit were false. Defense counsel subpoenaed Ceballos. 
Ceballos informed Najera that he was obligated to turn over his 
memorandum to the defense.110 Indeed, all parties involved in the 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at *5. 
For reasons that need not be recited—the code word Rampart says it all—there can 
be no doubt that, in Southern California, police misconduct is a matter of great 
political and social concern to the community. In recent years, various local law 
enforcement agencies have been severely criticized for what many believe to be 
serious misconduct on the part of police officers. 
Id.; see also id. at *6. “Rampart” refers to a division of the Los Angeles Police Department, so 
synonymous with police corruption and civil rights violations that, in 2000, the United States 
Department of Justice agreed to drop a civil rights lawsuit against the City and the Department 
after they consented to federal oversight. See, e.g., PBS Frontline, Rampart Scandal Timeline, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lapd/scandal/cron.html (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2007). 
 108. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004); Ceballos, 2002 WL 
34098285, at *1. 
 109. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171; Ceballos, 2002 WL 34098285, at *1. 
 110. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171. Ceballos cited to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), when advising his supervisor that he was obligated to turn over his memorandum to 
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Ceballos case conceded that “prosecutors have a duty to disclose 
information favorable to an accused, including information relating 
to a witness’s veracity and integrity.”111 The defense counsel in the 
case called Ceballos to testify at the hearing on the motion to 
traverse, at which he testified to his concerns about the affidavit. 
The trial court denied the defense’s motion. 
 Thereafter, Ceballos claimed the district attorney’s office 
retaliated against him with various adverse employment actions: 
reassignment as a trial deputy, transfer to another courthouse, and 
denial of a promotion; Najera threatened him when he advised her 
that he would testify truthfully at the hearing on the motion to 
traverse; his superiors afforded him the “silent” treatment or 
downright hostility; and his pending murder case was reassigned to a 
less-experienced deputy while he was barred from handling any future 
murder cases.112 Ceballos filed suit against Gil Garcetti (then-
district attorney) in his individual and official capacity, Najera and 
Sunstedt in their individual capacities, and the County of Los 
Angeles. Ceballos based his § 1983 cause of action on the 
defendants’ violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendments in 
“the aftermath of these events,” specifically for his submission of the 
disposition memorandum, his reporting and discussion of his concerns 
about the deputy sheriff’s misrepresentations, and his testimony at the 
hearing on the motion to traverse.113 
In contrast with the Supreme Court, the narrative voices of both 
the district court and the Ninth Circuit did not evade the fact that 
Ceballos had cooperated with his supervisors in all ways and had 
followed their advice in toning down his original memorandum. 
Those narrative voices also implied that Garcetti’s office was more 
sensitive to its working relationship with the sheriff’s department 
than it was to its ethical obligations: the material facts most favorable 
to Ceballos, but omitted by the Supreme Court majority, reveal that 
 
the defense. Id. “We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable 
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt 
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 
U.S. at 87. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) states: “The prosecutor in a criminal 
case shall . . . make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to 
the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense . . . .” 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2002). 
 111. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1179. 
 112. Id. at 1171–72. 
 113. Id. at 1171; Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at *1, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 
410 (2006) (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 190354. 
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not only was Ceballos required by his job to write the disposition 
memo that the warrant’s affidavit was questionable, but his superiors 
agreed with the memo’s assessment. When one supervisor expressed 
concern about the memo’s accusatory tenor, Ceballos revised it. 
Representatives of the sheriff’s department criticized Ceballos’ 
handling of the matter, but under no version of the facts—the 
Supreme Court’s included—is there any intimation that the memo 
was the cause célèbre at that meeting or that it was even discussed.114 
The Garcetti majority clearly played with the facts that favored 
Ceballos. The Garcetti majority had no difficulty in determining that 
Ceballos’ memo was the incendiary agent that took his superiors by 
surprise: “It demanded the attention of his supervisors and led to a 
heated meeting with employees from the sheriff’s department. If 
Ceballos’ superiors thought his memo was inflammatory or 
misguided, they had the authority to take proper corrective 
action.”115 Inasmuch as the undisputed version of the facts could 
lead to the equally likely inference that Ceballos’ supervisors acted 
childishly, the majority was clearly manipulating the facts. Although 
Ceballos was a government employee who had created a proper and 
correct document under proper supervision and during the course of 
his official work duties, his employer retaliated. Following a different 
narrative voice than the lower courts, the Supreme Court engaged in 
pseudocommunication in its narrative voice to justify that retaliation 
by glossing facts and inferences so that the recipient would accept 
the unpalatable conclusion. 
 
 114. The subject of the memo clearly was discussed at the meeting among district 
attorney representatives and sheriff’s department representatives, but there is nothing to 
suggest that the memo itself was the cause of the meeting’s becoming heated. Indeed, why 
would the sheriff’s department be in the least bit interested in a disposition motion written in 
the course of a deputy district attorney’s job? The more likely inference a rational southern 
California jury would have reached would have undercut the majority’s actual conclusion that 
Ceballos deserved punishment: the meeting was bound to become heated because of the 
subject matter of the memo, prompted by the pressure that law enforcement agencies in Los 
Angeles County were experiencing because of official misconduct. See PBS Frontline, supra 
note 107. 
 115. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422. Untangling the disposition memo from the remainder of 
Ceballos’ speech claims—including his reporting and discussion of the affidavit and his 
testimony at the hearing on the motion to traverse—is somewhat problematic under any 
version of the facts. The memo reached the Court; the other allegations did not. So the 
majority was required to throw its entire First Amendment analysis into what was an otherwise 
innocuous part of this government lawyer’s job. 
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Manipulating the facts works not only to make the story 
congruent with an unpalatable decision, but also to expand the 
sweep of the holding and the opinion’s precedential effect over other 
government employees. The majority’s painting an evocative picture 
of a bumbling government lawyer with long-suffering supervisors 
would certainly fulfill a certain audience’s notion of government 
employees in general.116 Although fitting Ceballos into this 
stereotype is “an endorsement that is not necessarily grounded in 
evidence,”117 it is part of a judicial rhetoric used to sustain a 
particular outcome.118 In Garcetti, the outcome is rooted in the 
authoritarian notion that government employees are not worthy of 
constitutional protection.119 The judicial rhetoric inducing that 
conclusion is “manipulative, selfish, [and] goal-oriented,”120 and 
thereby manifests classic characteristics of pseudocommunication. If 
the standard of review is to determine what a rational jury would be 
persuaded by, then the omission of persuasive background facts in 
favor of highlighting only those that agree with a particular political 
ideology demonstrates that the majority deliberately distorted its 
narrative voice from persuasion to propaganda. 
VI. THE GRANFALLOON RHETORIC 
Shaping the facts through the narrative voice is but one part of 
any judicial opinion. A court’s legal analysis—the “political 
narrative”—is paired with the chosen local narrative and derives from 
 
 116. Cf. Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, 39 CONN. L. REV. 159, 166–67 (2006) 
(discussing how judges evoke certain images of rural people and their lives in their opinions). 
 117. Id. at 172. 
 118. Id. at 166. 
 119. In addition, this type of judicial rhetoric, as socially constitutive communication, is 
designed to reach a specific community of recipients—other authoritarians, especially those 
with power—if not necessarily all the recipients. See James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, 
Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 690 
(1985). 
 120. Id. at 697. Perhaps the Court should not be persuasive when it writes its facts. If 
rhetorical devices are tools to decide disputes or disagreements, Rank, supra note 89, at 8, 
perhaps they should not be used in judicial opinions for legal matters in which neither exists, 
such as undisputed facts underlying motions of summary judgment. If the omission of 
undisputed facts is a falsehood wielded by the power of the bench rather than a persuasive 
device used by a trusted voice, then writing judicial opinions is no longer “a process of 
clarification characterized by candor.” JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE 
CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT’S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS 
SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND 40 (Oxford U. Press 1992). Instead, it 
becomes a “process of obfuscation characterized by disingenuousness.” Id. 
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the selected precedent or statutory analysis. Creating that political 
tradition and following a particular continuum has a powerful 
transformative effect on the dialogue in any particular area of law. 
Thus, the effects of a particular political persuasion have a very 
significant impact on the rhetoric that comprises legal analysis.121 
Consequently, a court becomes one of the sources for “provid[ing] 
and perpetuat[ing] the stories that lawyers need and use to make 
sense of the world. In a sense, these texts shape our sense of ‘pattern 
recognition.’”122 As a consequence, a court affects an area of law by 
not only its selectively imparted local narrative of the facts, but also 
by the political narrative of the law as it is eventually constituted. 
Through this political narrative, the community voice may be 
heard—that voice by which the author communicates with his 
communal readers or recipients.123 
This community voice must appeal to those communal recipients 
through its instrumental use of language: 
This means that one person engages another in an exchange of 
symbols to accomplish some goal. It is not communication for 
communication’s sake. Rhetoric is communication that attempts to 
coordinate social action. For this reason, rhetorical communication 
is explicitly pragmatic. Its goal is to influence human choices on 
specific matters that require immediate attention. Such 
communication is designed to achieve desired consequences in the 
relative short run.124 
In Garcetti, the specific community that the court references 
consists of the lawyers in the case, other judges who will be 
responsible for applying the case’s rule of law in the future, and 
similar legal audiences like law professors, Congress, reporters, and 
state legislatures.125 Moreover, the Court, invested as it is with the 
 
 121. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND 
POETICS OF THE LAW 34–35 (1985); Luban, supra note 91, at 2152, 2155; Maatman, supra 
note 90, at 12. 
 122. Maatman, supra note 90, at 12. 
 123. Id. at 8. 
 124. GERALD A. HAUSER, INTRODUCTION TO RHETORICAL THEORY 2–3 (Harper & 
Row 1986); Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Shooting from the Lip: United States v. 
Dickerson, Role [Im]morality, and the Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 13 
(2000). 
 125. Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW’S STORIES: 
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 199 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., Yale Univ. 
Press 1996). However, the entire audience of a Supreme Court opinion by the “power” 
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ultimate power to convey messages to this particular audience, is in a 
position to manipulate that political narrative through pseudo-
communication.126 
The majority of the Court, in vocalizing this politico-communal 
voice in Garcetti, adopted Granfalloon127 rhetoric, a rhetoric that 
creates both an in-group and an out-group in the audience. In 
granfalloon rhetoric, the community being addressed is reminded 
that “[i]f you want to be a chosen one, then you must act like a 
chosen one.”128 This rhetoric harmonizes with authoritarianism and 
reflects a history of a “dominant” culture—here, corporate 
employers, usually white and male—which displaces the function of 
legal reasoning in supplying the rhetoric to justify a particular 
decision.129 In Garcetti, the majority’s political narrative included not 
just a legal analysis but imposed a cultural language. This language 
generated traction as far back as Pickering and gained impetus as the 
character of the Court changed with new conservative appointments. 
The Court achieved this effect not by legal analysis but by cultural 
and social analysis passing as legal analysis. The legal analysis clearly 
asserts that government employees have no First Amendment rights, 
but the rationale for this legal analysis suggests that the historical 
continuity of this area of law is at an end, the story is already told 
and a particular plaintiff cannot win. In this regard, the rhetoric is 
more emotive than rational in supplying the reasoning for a 
particular result.130 Such rhetoric smacks of manipulation not by law 
 
invested in it remains We the People, a “requisite to a government by consent.” GOLDSTEIN, 
supra note 120, at 19. 
 126. Levinson, supra note 125, at 194–95. 
 127. “Granfalloon” was coined by Kurt Vonnegut and means “proud and meaningless 
associations of human beings.” ANTHONY R. PRATKANIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, AGE OF 
PROPAGANDA: THE EVERYDAY USE AND ABUSE OF PERSUASION 168 (W.H. Freeman & Co. 
1992). 
 128. Id. at 243. The cognitive aspect of a granfalloon divides into groups to make sense 
of the world while the motivational aspect creates the belonging suggested by membership in a 
group. Id. at 168–69. 
 129. For example, Professor Maatman suggests that the Supreme Court’s legitimization 
of the legal view that racism and discrimination are rare has seeped through to the lower courts 
in a world view that now suggests the legal equivalence of legislative history, that white 
popular opinion has a legally constitutive effect on decisions under Title VII. Maatman, supra 
note 90, at 54–62. In the process, “losers endure not only the material burdens of defeat, but 
also the ignominy of helplessly witnessing their own past edited, their own voices silenced in 
the attempt to tell the past.” Luban, supra note 91, at 2155. 
 130. See Andrea McArdle, Teaching Writing in Clinical, Lawyering, and Legal Writing 
Courses: Negotiating Professional and Personal Voice, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 501, 508–09 
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but by political forces, which is described in characteristic (5) of 
pseudocommunication: Appeals used are directed toward the 
emotional, with an emphasis on finding emotional connections 
between the receiver and the message, thereby fulfilling the goals of 
the granfalloon.131 
The corporate granfalloon adopted in the majority’s legal 
rationale started modestly in its citation to a couple of cases. Indeed, 
the opinion started out as if it were a lawyer’s granfalloon, with that 
specific audience in mind. The citations to precedent in the political 
narrative were “proof” that the Garcetti opinion was a piece of the 
historical continuity of government employee First Amendment 
protections so as to persuade the audience of the reasonableness of 
the outcome, that is, that the government can punish a government 
employee who is doing his job. While giving lip-service to the 
historical narrative that “informed, vibrant dialogue” is essential to a 
democratic society, the majority observed that the community would 
be deprived of informed opinions if public employees were not 
allowed to speak on matters of public concern about their 
employer.132 The majority then went off the rails by unmasking its 
lawyer’s granfalloon as the corporate granfalloon, addressing an even 
more exclusive audience of readers. 
In accordance with the mindset of the corporate granfalloon, 
once Ceballos accepted a job with the Los Angeles County District 
Attorney’s office, he was no longer a citizen. Each task of the job he 
performed was not performed as a citizen but as an employee and 
consequently subject to evaluation.133 Although government 
employees retain the right to engage in civic discourse as citizens, 
“[t]his prospect of protection . . . does not invest them with a right 
to perform their jobs however they see fit.”134 An unnamed 
 
(2006); see generally Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in 
Supreme Court Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193 (2002). 
 131. This would seem contrary to what one would view as the main focus of the legal 
rhetor, the arguments based on logic. See Michael Frost, Introduction to Clasical Legal 
Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 613, 619 (1999). If logos is premised on 
rhetorical syllogisms (enthymeme) that present the “good reasons” for the audience to be 
persuaded by the speaker’s argument, HAUSER, supra note 124, at 75–76, then propaganda 
shortcuts the need for the logos because there is no “good reason” supported by a rhetorical 
syllogism in propaganda. It is completely one-sided without the need for the audience to 
supply the unexpressed portion of the syllogism. 
 132. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006). 
 133. Id. at 421. 
 134. Id. at 422. 
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precedent, according to the Court, endowed government employers 
with the discretion to manage their “operations,” requiring 
“heightened interest[] in controlling speech made by an employee in 
his or her professional capacity. Official communications have official 
consequences, creating a need for substantive consistency and clarity. 
Supervisors must ensure that their employees’ official 
communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and 
promote the employer’s mission.”135 The government employer may 
control employee speech because the employer paid for the speech 
itself.136 Ceballos’ disposition memorandum was a case in point: “It 
demanded the attention of his supervisors and led to a heated 
meeting with employees from the sheriff’s department. If Ceballos’ 
superiors thought his memo was inflammatory or misguided, they 
had the authority to take proper corrective action.”137 
The majority was quick to point out that its holding was not 
intended to denigrate the importance of reporting government 
misconduct and inefficiency. These remain very real concerns, and 
“public employers should, ‘as a matter of good judgment,’ be 
‘receptive to constructive criticism offered by their employees.’”138 
Indeed, the “powerful network of legislative enactments—such as 
whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes”—exists to protect 
those employees who expose misconduct and inefficiency.139 
Furthermore, the majority acknowledged that government attorneys 
must follow ethical rules and constitutional guidelines, thereby 
protecting those government attorneys from interference by 
government employers.140 
We reject, however, the notion that the First Amendment shields 
from discipline the expressions employees make pursuant to their 
professional duties. Our [unnamed] precedents do not support the 
 
 135. Id. at 422–23. 
 136. Id. at 422 (“It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the 
employer itself has commissioned or created.”) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). 
 137. Id. at 423. The majority’s justification is that “[p]roper application of our [unnamed 
and unexamined] precedents . . . leads to the conclusion that the First Amendment does not 
prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant to official 
responsibilities.” Id. at 424. 
 138. Id. at 425 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983)). 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. at 425–26. 
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existence of a constitutional cause of action behind every statement 
a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job.141 
This analysis is the sum total of the Garcetti Court’s rationale. The 
common thread here, unwoven as it is from any case precedent or 
historical continuity recognized by lawyers, is clearly intended to 
communicate to the corporate granfalloon that the Court is a 
member of “their” group and warmly supports their interests. 
The majority continued in this corporate political narrative to 
counter the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ceballos’ favor, averring that 
such a holding would 
commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive 
role, mandating judicial oversight of communications between and 
among government employees and their superiors in the course of 
official business. This displacement of managerial discretion by 
judicial supervision finds no support in our precedents.142 
Cloaking this strawman in the armor of corporate granfalloonery 
probably shielded the majority from the irony of the absence of 
precedential support for its own holding.143 
 
 141. Id. at 426. 
 142. Id. at 423. 
 143. The majority decision particularly criticized the Ninth Circuit’s concerns about the 
contradictions inherent in punishing official-duty speech but not public speech when the Court 
of Appeals observed that:  
The proposed per se rule would be particularly detrimental to whistle blowers, such 
as Ceballos, who report official misconduct up the chain of command, because all 
public employees have a duty to notify their supervisors about any wrongful conduct 
of which they become aware. To deprive public employees of constitutional 
protection when they fulfill this employment obligation, while affording them 
protection if they bypass their supervisors and take their tales, for profit or 
otherwise, directly to a scandal sheet or to an internet political smut purveyor defies 
sound reason. 
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court did not view this as a 
doctrinal anomaly because the types of speech are distinct: all citizens enjoy speech rights for 
public expressions. Those citizens, however, who are also government employees have a bit less 
First Amendment protection than private citizens in their public expressions, such as writing 
letters to the editors. When they are working, public employees are noncitizens. 
  This new category of noncitizens concocted by the Court—government employees 
speaking in their official duties—is analogous to and therefore subject to the same punishments 
as private employees. Therefore, as the Court implies, the Ninth Circuit was looking at the 
wrong syllogism because this decision would only affect those employees acting in their official 
responsibilities, not to their statements made outside the duties of their employment. Instead, 
government employers could adopt policies of prior restraint: 
A public employer that wishes to encourage its employees to voice concerns 
privately retains the option of instituting internal policies and procedures that are 
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In addition to its underlying rationale, the majority opinion 
clarified two points in closing. First, because the Court was bound 
by the fact that Ceballos’ memo was drafted pursuant to his official 
duties, the majority had no cause to set out a comprehensive 
framework by which future courts could define the scope of any 
employee’s duties.144 The second clarifying point was to assure that 
this decision would not undercut academic freedom because that was 
not included in the question before the Court.145 These points were 
designed to assuage the blistering dissents, especially Justice Souter’s, 
which tried to maintain a vestige of the lawyer granfalloon by 
attacking the underpinnings of the majority’s corporate analysis. 
The dissents, on the other hand, were couched in the 
methodology of legal analysis, distinct from and at cross-purposes 
with the corporate granfalloonery of the majority. The first dissent, 
Justice Stevens’, hit most succinctly the error in legal analysis in the 
decision: this holding adds an anomalous and unnecessary inquiry 
into the government employee’s job duties to determine whether her 
speech is protected.146 
On the other hand, Justice Souter’s dissent—joined by Justices 
Stevens and Ginsberg—made three major points. First, although 
Justice Souter agreed that the government has significant interests in 
making sure its employees do their jobs properly and honestly, the 
majority went too far in its leap from the Connick-Pickering 
paradigm when a government employee may be disciplined for on-
the-job complaints about his or her own employment.147 Instead, the 
 
receptive to employee criticism. Giving employees an internal forum for their speech 
will discourage them from concluding that the safest avenue of expression is to state 
their views in public. 
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
 144. The majority opinion did warn that government employers could not create overly 
broad job descriptions that would cover all employee speech. The inquiry would be a practical 
one, an ad hoc evaluation not confined to formal written job descriptions because they may be 
either too broad or too narrow. Id. at 424–25. 
 145. Id. at 425. Specifically, the Court stated: 
There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or 
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully 
accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need 
not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today 
would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or 
teaching. 
Id. 
 146. Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 137 (1983). 
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Pickering balancing test—which the majority abandoned 
altogether—is the rule of law best suited to weigh the value of the 
employee’s speech against the interest of the government in 
providing services.148 Second, Justice Souter bristled at the majority’s 
characterization that, if the government “pays” for the speech, then 
it has the right to absolute control because such characterization 
would imperil academic freedom in public colleges and 
universities.149 Last, Souter derided the majority’s reliance on 
whistleblower statutes to provide sufficient cover for government 
employees as justification because the definitions of whistleblowers in 
the different jurisdictions’ statutes might not cover all employee 
speech nor all employees as the First Amendment’s blanket 
prohibition would.150 
Justice Breyer’s dissent echoed these concerns; however, he 
would not circumscribe acceptable employee speech to official 
misconduct and health and safety concerns as Justice Souter might. 
For Justice Breyer, the Pickering balancing test remains the most 
effective way of balancing the justified disclosure of matters of public 
concern and the government’s interest in the functioning of the 
workplace.151 Indeed, he focused on the “public concern” aspect of 
the balancing test: “There are . . . far too many issues of public 
concern, even if defined as ‘matters of unusual importance,’ for 
[Justice Souter’s] screen to screen out very much. Government 
administration typically involves matters of public concern. Why else 
would government be involved?”152 But the dissenting Justices, 
posing questions of legal analysis and logic, wasted their efforts 
 
 148. When an employee, during the course of her job, is “speaking as a citizen, that is, 
with a citizen’s interest, [she] is protected from reprisal unless the statements are too damaging 
to the government’s capacity to conduct public business to be justified by an individual or 
public benefit thought to flow from the statements.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 428. Justice Souter 
argued that, at the very least, protected employee speech could be carved out for those 
instances when the employee is speaking about official misconduct, unlawful government 
behavior, and threats to health and safety. Id. at 435. He also pointed out that the circuit 
courts of appeals that had used this expanded balancing test had not experienced a flood of 
litigation as opined by the majority, citing an average of approximately 170 cases per year in 
the circuit and district courts. Id. at 435–36. Ironically, during the first year after Garcetti, 
approximately 280 cases flooded the courts on this government employee speech issue, and the 
tide does not appear to be receding. 
 149. Id. at 438–39. 
 150. Id. at 439–40. 
 151. Id. at 444–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 152. Id. at 448. 
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trying to persuade their peers to abandon the corporate granfalloon 
in favor of the wider legal audience. 
The corporate nature of this community voice employed and its 
pseudocommunication characteristics are apparent throughout the 
majority opinion in its effort to convert the legal audience to its 
authoritarian model. First, its exhortations to the audience are to 
“emulate some unnamed and . . . perhaps questionable group who 
‘carry on the important affairs of the world.’”153 That exhortation is 
that government employers are unchallengeable in matters of 
“managerial discretion” and “discipline” of employees’ speech, a trait 
of the authoritarian nature. Second, the opinion is rife with the 
idealization of the corporate model of government. There is little 
doubt that the majority is politically aligned with the continuing 
battle to corporatize, if not privatize, government. The community is 
now to believe that managers are patient and kind and concerned 
about the quality of work of its employees when, in reality, these 
managers have deficient management skills.154 It is the thin-skinned 
supervisor who so often gets caught up in these First Amendment 
cases in the first place.155 The majority would have the audience trust 
government managers but mistrust government employees, elevating 
managers to authoritarian omnipotence. Last, and perhaps most 
important for the authoritarian message, is the fear this decision 
instills in government employees contrary to all notions of good 
corporate management: 
Call it consensus, competition, no-nonsense management, 
whatever you like. Call it by any label you wish, but if the operation 
is launched from a springboard of fear, it will produce creative 
paralysis, incompetence, goal-defeating vindictiveness, and worse. 
As mountains of evidence demonstrate, when skin preservation 
comes first, other considerations—including organizational goals—
get brushed aside in the hectic fight for survival.156 
 
 153. Moran, supra note 21, at 116. 
 154. “Supervisors and managers are human. To avoid the perception of unfairness, 
however, it’s important that supervisors exercise self-control. A supervisor should never act or 
make a decision out of anger . . . .” ANNE H. WILLIAMS, KNOW YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES: 
ETHICS & FIDUCIARY DUTIES FOR HR 5 (M. Lee Smith Publishers 2004). 
 155. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
 156. RAYMOND DREYFACK, SURE FAIL: THE ART OF MISMANAGEMENT 96 (William 
Morrow & Co. 1976). 
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The majority relied on business practices to rationalize its 
decision, but one would be hard pressed to find any authority on 
corporate human resources that would suggest that the way to run 
an efficient corporation is to punish the employee who is doing his 
job properly.157 In the manner of all good pseudocommunication, 
the majority’s stated and intended purposes are contradictory. 
Perhaps the Court’s problem is that smart, but inexperienced, 
law clerks are now the primary authors of its decisions.158 As a 
consequence, the Justices themselves are distanced from the opinion-
writing process and feel less ownership of the product. 
Unfortunately, these smart but inexperienced lawyers are not just 
“framing” the doctrine,159 they are shaping that doctrine in the 
language they use and the rhetorical devices on which they rely to 
get a political point across. No doubt such authorship responsibility 
affects the community voice of the majority.160 And when the 
community voice is distorted, weak legal analysis ensues. 
Hiding weak legal analysis by pseudocommunication is the point 
and is nowhere more evident than in the majority’s rationale in 
Garcetti. One of the overarching contradictions in the decision is 
that, although government employees are competent enough to be 
hired, they are just not competent enough to speak. They are, 
however, competent enough to engage in the vibrant dialogue of 
democracy so long as they do not do it while on the job, excluding 
matters of health, safety, and ethics. This vision of employee 
incompetence is clearly articulated by the majority’s notion that 
government employee speech can be controlled because the 
government employer “commissioned or created” it.161 In addition 
to the majority’s flawed reading of precedent to support such a rule 
of law,162 there seems to be a lack of understanding of who actually 
 
 157. See generally JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE: APPROACHING FAIRNESS IN HUMAN 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (Russell Cropanzano ed., 1993). 
 158. Ray, supra note 130, at 221–23. 
 159. Laura Krugman Ray, Judging the Justices: A Supreme Court Performance Review, 76 
TEMP. L. REV. 209, 216 (2003). 
 160. See Maatman, supra note 90, at 8. 
 161. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006).  
 162. The majority’s proposition rested on the tenuous analysis of Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). The Rosenberger principle holds that 
when government appropriates money for a policy, the speaker who receives the appropriation 
must hew to that policy. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 435–38 (Souter, J., dissenting). Appropriations 
would appear to be substantively distinct from salaries. 
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pays for that speech. It seems rather obtuse to suggest that any 
government supervisor—many of whom are political appointees—is 
the only commissioner or creator of government speech without 
some consideration of the taxpayers who actually pay for it and to 
whom the government employee owes service. Furthermore, the 
majority’s attack on employee incompetence eliminated the 
protection of the First Amendment for government employees in 
terms similar to those found in student speech cases. However, after 
Garcetti, schoolchildren have more First Amendment speech rights 
than government employees because school administrators can only 
exercise “editorial control over the style and content of student 
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions 
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”163 
Government supervisors have no similar constraints. Scraping past 
the surface of the pseudocommunication reveals little legal substance 
and less legal authority. 
Garcetti essentially holds that government employees can be 
punished without regard to style or content of speech and the 
employer need not have any rational reason for the punishment. This 
ostensible rule of law is justified because “[r]estricting speech that 
owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities 
does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a 
private citizen.”164 Except, of course, the First Amendment protects 
citizens from the power of the State. Before Garcetti, government 
employees, unlike private citizens, had a constant relationship to the 
State, and constitutional measures protected that constant 
relationship in balancing the rights of the individual against the 
State. For instance, many government employees possess due process 
rights in their jobs whereas private citizens do not.165 The Garcetti 
decision now inexplicably requires there be some relevant 
constitutional analogue to private citizens who do not work for the 
government in order for the First Amendment to apply to 
government employees.166 
 
 163. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (emphasis added). 
 164. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (majority opinion). 
 165. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985); see 
also Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights that Work at Work: From the First Amendment to Due 
Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1464 (2007). 
 166. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423. It would seem more fitting for the private sector to look 
to the public sector to protect its employees rather than the other way around. 
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The crux of this whole authoritarian political narrative is that 
government employees are no longer “citizens.” Up until this time, 
the government employee’s job status and duties were never at issue 
in First Amendment jurisprudence.167 No analysis of the Court’s 
precedents would even hint at such a dichotomy. Instead, the focus 
had always been on the speech and whether it was disruptive or 
not.168 Yet the absence of precedent did not stop the majority: 
through pseudocommunication it erected a bogeyman—that the 
First Amendment does not invest public employees with the right to 
“constitutionalize the employee grievance”—rather than analyzing a 
legal justification for off government employee speech.169 Quoting 
from Connick v. Myers, the majority extrapolated employee 
grievances as being any speech uttered by government employees 
while doing their jobs. The “legal” principle by which the majority 
supports that proposition is that government employees have no 
“right to perform their jobs however they see fit,”170 the irony of 
which is that Ceballos was doing his job correctly and as directed by 
his supervisors!  
The community voice in Garcetti tried a tone of reasonableness 
to hide the fact that there was no legal precedent and, therefore, no 
legal analysis to support this stripping of First Amendment rights. 
Instead, the political narrative is fairly apparent—in its patronizing, 
authoritarian air and its fallacious “legal” arguments—the Court 
intended to elevate bad government managers while demonizing the 
government employee. It is ironic that the young law clerk to the 
Supreme Court who drafted the decision was (and perhaps still is) a 
government employee. It is ironic that the Court, all government 
employees, actually believe they are in the corporate granfalloon. 
This authoritarian pseudocommunication is essentially an 
exhortation to submit to higher authorities because they are 
established and “legitimate.” Their legitimacy, of course, depends 
solely on the political narrative adopted by the Court majority in 
Garcetti, which emphasizes that some groups of people are not equal 
to others. Concomitantly, the holding serves the purpose of reining 
in freedom of speech. By couching this narrative in terms familiar to 
the legal profession, the majority assures itself that it is speaking in a 
 
 167. Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 168. See Nahmod, supra note 87, at 573–77. 
 169. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 137, 154 (1983)). 
 170. Id. at 422. 
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community voice to the legal audience. Instead, the rhetoric 
employed by the majority constrains the identification of that 
community to a small sector of the legal profession, other 
authoritarians, and the corporate “public” audience. 
VII. THE SYMBOLIC VOICE 
The Court, of course, has a purpose in legitimizing its rhetoric in 
Garcetti. If legal rhetoric creates a community of shared language,171 
then the goal of a particular political group in the legal community 
can use judicial rhetoric to create new communal and cultural 
references. This new “shared language”172 then establishes the 
language of succeeding cases and changes the judicial rhetoric in any 
particular area of law. Specific language choices of the Court 
majority in Garcetti are peculiar to a legal cultural subset rather than 
to the legal community at large, especially words that have symbolic 
meaning to a politically conservative community that is predisposed 
to authoritarianism. Such reliance on symbols significantly alters the 
Court’s role from rhetorically persuading society to embrace certain 
values for the good of the community to symbol-maker persuading 
the audience to follow because of the ritual observance of symbols 
important to the community.173 The problem for the Court is its 
embrace of symbols that are not for the good of the community. 
Symbols make pseudocommunication succeed: the sender 
analyzes the Universe with certainty and reduces that analysis to a 
simple word, phrase, or slogan. Thus, symbols that are important to 
a specific political community are particularly appealing. These 
symbols may be words and ideas with specific meanings for the 
particular subgroup—like a secret code, password or handshake—
although they have no legal credibility in the legal community at 
large. They are iconic of the subgroup’s political message with no 
legal significance but for their use in a judicial opinion, by which 
they are “sold” as symbols of the legal community at large. Their 
presence in a majority decision of the Supreme Court is therefore 
disquieting because the majority is attempting to make these 
aberrant words mainstream symbols regardless of whether they are 
 
 171. WHITE, supra note 121, at 33–35. 
 172. Id. at 172. 
 173. Marie A. Failinger, Against Idols: The Court as a Symbol-Making or Rhetorical 
Institution, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 367, 371–72 (2006). 
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appropriate in the legal context. But the importance of the symbols 
is crucial for the success of the Court’s authoritarianism. 
Symbols unite the membership of a political subgroup. Indeed, 
authoritarians are “suckers for slogans and sayings.”174 If the 
authoritarian worldview is that some groups are more worthy than 
others, then this group wants to be the most worthy, united by a 
common understanding and sense of belonging. Consequently, these 
symbols become shibboleths, or passwords: their words have specific 
meanings accorded them by this subgroup, meanings that might 
otherwise be unknown to everyone else.175 The idea of “belonging” 
is implied in the word: “[T]he shibboleth is known only to those in 
the In Crowd.”176 Shibboleths in current parlance might include 
“compassion for Democrats” and “balanced budget for 
Republicans.”177 Shibboleths are particularly apt for the 
authoritarians because, as one rather jaded observer has noted, “the 
vast majority of men, and almost all women, are swayed by rhetoric 
rather than by logic, by the emotions more than by the intellect.”178 
Shibboleths in the control of a particular ideology can also take 
on the weight of ideographs. Ideographs can be used as a form of 
social control—words whose very use insists on some form of social 
conformity, even to persuasive effect on an entire community.179 
 
 174. ALTEMEYER, supra note 30, at 99. 
 175. “Shibboleth” means: “1. A word or pronunciation that distinguishes people of one 
group or class from those of another. 2a. A word or phrase identified with a particular group or 
cause; a catchword. b. A commonplace saying or idea. 3. A custom or practice that betrays one 
as an outsider.” AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2006), available at 
http://www.bartleby.com/61/11/S0341100.html. “Originally denoting a word or phrase 
whose use betokens membership in a select group, it has lived to see its once-distinctive 
meaning eroded by time and misuse. Today a shibboleth is a slogan or catchphrase of any type, 
even sometimes . . . little more than a tenet or credo.” David Franklin, Slogans & Shibboleths, 1 
GREEN BAG 2D 195, 195 (1998). 
 176. Franklin, supra note 175, at 196–97. 
 177. Id. at 197. 
 178. WILLIAM SAMUEL LILLY, ON SHIBBOLETHS 1 (Chapman & Hall 1892).  
Few are capable of following—to say nothing of judging—a sustained argument. 
But an apt phrase convinces the dullest with singular persuasiveness. And, in some 
cases, it becomes a Shibboleth, the faculty of effectively pronouncing which is a key 
to popular favor. It is easy to gibe at this mode of leading men by the ears. It is 
more philosophical to remember that as precedents are the application or 
misapplication of principles, so Shibboleths are the application or misapplication of 
syllogisms. 
Id. at 2. 
 179. Michael Calvin McGee, The “Ideograph”: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology, 66 
Q. J. SPEECH 1, 6 (1980). 
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Often these words have intrinsic force in and of themselves without 
regard to their use as an argumentative proposition. Words such as 
“liberty,” “property” and “rule of law” are ideographs because they 
are “the basic structural elements, the building blocks, of 
ideology.”180 Rather than standing for a unique proposition, an 
ideograph encompasses the spectrum of the series of meanings by 
which the term can be used.181 Ideographs exist as symbols of 
discourse, but they also become integral to the political 
consciousness of the people who use them.182 Ideographs can unite 
within a group but can also create divisions between groups: 
[T]here are special interests within the United States separated one 
from the other precisely by disagreements regarding the identity, 
legitimacy or definition of ideographs. So we are divided by usages 
into subgroups: Business and labor, Democrats and Republicans, 
Yankees and Southerners are united by the ideographs that 
represent the political entity “United States” and separated by a 
disagreement as to the practical meaning of such ideographs.183 
The meaning of an ideograph might evolve over time although its 
categorical meaning remains as “a constant reference to its history as 
an ideograph.”184 Thus, the ideographs “liberty” and “equality” 
might expand or contract historically; however, the common 
denominator of each as the most descriptive term for the moment 
remains, not unlike the historical narrative of a rule of law.185 
 
 180. Id. at 6–7. 
 181. Ideographs are one-term sums of an orientation, the species of “God” or 
“Ultimate” term that will be used to symbolize the line of argument the meanest sort of 
individual would pursue, if that individual had the dialectical skills of philosophers, as a defense 
of a personal stake in and commitment to the society. Nor is one permitted to question the 
fundamental logic of ideographs: everyone is conditioned to think of “the rule of law” as a 
logical commitment just as one is taught to think that “186,000 miles per second” is an 
accurate empirical description of the speed of light even though few can work the experiments 
or do the mathematics to prove it. Id. 
 182. Id. “With regard to political union and separation, such vocabularies would consist 
of ideographs. Such usages as ‘liberty’ define a collectivity, i.e., the outer parameters of a 
society, because such terms either do not exist in other societies or do not have precisely 
similar meanings.” Id. at 8. “In practice, . . . ideology is a political language composed of 
slogan-like terms signifying collective commitment.” Id. at 15. 
 183. Id. at 8. 
 184. Id. at 10. 
 185. Id. 
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In practice, the rhetorical force of ideographs seems structured 
horizontally in the context of other ideographs.186 However, when 
ideographs are required to “do work”187 in an ideological conflict, 
their meanings might change. For example, a community may have a 
fairly clear categorical—if not historically vertical—understanding of 
the consonance of the ideographs “principle of confidentiality” and 
“rule of law.” However, their meanings are challenged by putting 
them in opposition to each other as when Richard M. Nixon relied 
upon the “principle of confidentiality” to ignore the “rule of law.”188 
Or, “[a]n ideological argument could result simply from multiple 
usages of an ideograph.”189 Thus, “when we engage ideological 
argument, when we cause ideographs to do work in explaining, 
justifying, or guiding policy in specific situations, the relationship of 
ideographs changes.”190 It was in this manner that the Court’s 
shibboleths were tested. 
In Garcetti, the Court was faced with the ideograph “freedom of 
speech.” It is an ideograph with a pretty homogeneous meaning, 
both chronologically and categorically, arising from the protections 
offered by the Founders against the power of the government. 
However, Garcetti juxtaposed against that ideograph such phrases as 
“managerial discretion” and “managerial discipline.” These two 
phrases are shibboleths of business interests like the Chamber of 
Commerce rather than ideographs like “freedom of speech” or 
“patriotism.” Clearly, not ideographs of democratic values nor of the 
proportion of “freedom of speech,” the majority of the Court not 
only elevated “managerial discretion” to ideograph status, but in a 
head-to-head confrontation with “freedom of speech,” managerial 
discretion prevailed. 
 
 186. Id. at 12. 
 187. Id. at 13. 
 188. Id. at 12–13. 
 189. Id. at 14. 
Each member of the community is socialized, conditioned, to the vocabulary of 
ideographs as a prerequisite for ‘belonging’ to the society. A degree of tolerance is 
usual, but people are expected to understand ideographs within a range of usage 
thought to be acceptable: The society will inflict penalties on those who use 
ideographs in heretical ways and on those who refuse to respond appropriately to 
claims on their behavior warranted through the agency of ideographs. 
Id. at 15–16. 
 190. Id. at 13. 
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The Court’s use of such rhetorical devices differs little from its 
use of iconic rhetorical devices to persuade the reader of the 
legitimacy of an opinion. For example, the Court often uses 
nonbinding sources—such as John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, or 
Blackstone’s Commentaries191—in order to create a foundation of 
legitimacy for a decision. There is, however, a distinction to the 
legitimacy of the shibboleths as ideographs that the Garcetti majority 
used: when the Court relies on John Stuart Mill for a tactical, 
persuasive purpose, it is surely relying on a source of significantly 
more universal importance than a shibboleth arising from the 
corporate interests that coined the phrase “managerial discretion.”192 
To the extent that the Court has elevated “managerial 
discretion” now to be an ideograph, it is more like Orwell’s 
“meaningless words,” words that can arouse positive feelings but can 
have a private definition held by the author. Words like 
“democracy,” “socialism,” “freedom,” and “patriotic” are “often 
used in a consciously dishonest way. That is, the person who uses 
them has his own private definition, but allows his hearer to think he 
means something quite different.”193 The use of these words in 
political writing is imitative and conforms to some kind of 
orthodoxy.194 This is Orwell’s “duckspeak” in 1984,195 where 
ideographic words have no meaning at all. Such words can be 
dropped into a speech or a tract, and they will garner a “signal” 
reaction without any thought to their meaning whatsoever, with 
 
 191. Robert L. Hume, The Use of Rhetorical Sources by the U.S. Supreme Court, 40 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 817, 817–18 (2006). 
 192. This elevation of shibboleth to meaningless ideograph has similar symbolic value as 
the use of iconography in government, such as eagles, standards, helmets, belts, boots, and 
flags. See, e.g., STEVEN BACH, LENI: THE LIFE AND WORK OF LENI RIEFENSTAHL 134–35 
(2007). 
 193. Fischer, supra note 22, at 146–47 (using the USA PATRIOT Act to illustrate the 
meaninglessness of the word “patriot” in an act that essentially curtails substantial civil 
liberties); George Orwell, Politics and English Language, in SHOOTING AN ELEPHANT AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 83 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1950).  
 194. Orwell, supra note 193, at 87. 
A speaker who uses that kind of phraseology has gone some distance towards 
turning himself into a machine. The appropriate noises are coming out of his larynx, 
but his brain is not involved as it would be if he were choosing his words for 
himself. . . . And this reduced state of consciousness, if not indispensable, is at any 
rate favorable to political conformity. 
Id. 
 195. WILLIAM LUTZ, THE NEW DOUBLESPEAK: WHY NO ONE KNOWS WHAT ANYONE’S 
SAYING ANYMORE 55 (1996); ORWELL, 1984, supra note 20, at 54. 
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“[n]o need for logic or reason, or any kind of thought.”196 More so 
the harm when they are ideographs of limited pedigree and even 
more limited legal usage, such as “managerial discretion,” now given 
the imprimatur of the Supreme Court to achieve actual ideographic 
status. 
The majority opinion also mau-maued the ideograph “citizen” 
and so warped its meaning as to make it virtually unrecognizable and 
usable in only limited senses. In effect, government employees are no 
longer citizens when they are on the job. Therefore, they are no 
longer entitled to constitutional protections. There is nothing in 
precedent that would suggest a large segment of the population with 
a constant relationship with the government would have the intrinsic 
value of citizenship stripped from them. This newly formed 
distinction is made whole cloth from meaningless language 
employed by the majority. To suggest that a government employee 
can be punished for speaking out about government corruption 
while she is doing her job is to hew too closely to the authoritarian 
notion of fear and conformity as well as the corporate world where 
employees can be kept in their place by threats of at-will dismissal.197 
The adoption of corporate ideographs into legal analysis was clearly 
intentional to obfuscate the fact that there is no legal grounding for 
this result as well as to create precedential value for their continued 
use. 
Then there is the majority’s nearly nonsensical and clearly 
gratuitous insertion of the ideographic shibboleths “federalism” and 
“separation of powers” in the context of asserting that the judiciary 
should not insert itself between the government employer and its 
employees. Thus, the Court suggests that, when an employee is 
simply doing his official duties, the delicate balancing required of the 
First Amendment cases is unnecessary: “To hold otherwise would be 
to demand permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of 
governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound 
principles of federalism and the separation of powers.”198 But what is 
the legal significance of these words: What is the relevance of 
“separation of powers” if all three branches are government 
 
 196. LUTZ, supra note 195, at 54–56. 
 197. See, e.g., BRUCE BARRY, SPEECHLESS: THE EROSION OF FREE EXPRESSION IN THE 
AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2007); STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE: TOUGH TIMES 
FOR THE AMERICAN WORKER (2008). 
 198. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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employers? Are not members of the judiciary as well as their law 
clerks actually employees of the government? And depending upon 
which meaning of “federalism” is being employed here, is there a 
distinction between State as employer and Nation as employer? This 
nonsensical use of iconic phrases has no legal function in Garcetti 
but is useful in establishing their precedential value as ideographs for 
later cases. 
Garcetti delivers a paean to the virtues of corporate management 
and its inherent superiority over government and especially 
government employees in passages rife with symbols and 
ideographs.199 The Court has raised the political symbols of 
“managerial discipline” and “managerial discretion” to greater 
stature than “freedom of speech,” reflecting the authoritarian’s fear 
of such freedoms. Through the use of pseudocommunication, the 
Court’s authoritarian members have successfully engaged with and 
humbled the ideograph of “freedom of speech.”200 
VIII. THE EMPTY VOICE 
Last but not least, the Court majority employed empty rhetoric 
in pursuit of its authoritarian mission. Pseudocommunication is the 
essence of cant.201 Cant is more than one form of distorted language 
and covers all that is implied in “monotonous, mechanical 
 
 199. For example: 
Our holding likewise is supported by the emphasis of our precedents on affording 
government employers sufficient discretion to manage their operations. Employers 
have heightened interests in controlling speech made by an employee in his or her 
professional capacity. Official communications have official consequences, creating a 
need for substantive consistency and clarity. Supervisors must ensure that their 
employees’ official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and 
promote the employer’s mission. 
Id. at 422–23. This passage would make sense if Ceballos’ superiors had not already vetted the 
memo or that Ceballos was not actually doing his job. 
 200. For a similar discussion on the inconsistent use of ideographs, see Theodore O. 
Prosise & Craig R. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Bush v. Gore: A Rhetoric of 
Inconsistency, 4 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 605 (2001). 
 201. Cant has been defined as: 
1. Monotonous talk filled with platitudes. 2. Hypocritically pious language. 3. The 
special vocabulary peculiar to the members of an underworld group; argot . . . . 5. 
Whining speech, such as that used by beggars. 6. The special terminology 
understood among the members of a profession, discipline, or class but obscure to 
the general population; jargon.  
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 273 (4th ed. 2006), 
available at http://dictionary2.classic.reference.com/browse/Canting*ly. 
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speech.”202 Cant “discourage[s] clear thought, create[s] doublethink 
and falsehood, prevent[s] our seeing the world as it is, and in 
important ways diminish[es] our humanity.”203 Cant is a primary 
resource for Garcetti’s majority to subvert the legal specialized 
language into an instrument of authoritarian doublespeak. 
Doublespeak is the philosophical handmaiden to pseudo-
communication. Doublespeak controls messages, particularly 
political messages, in a way designed to convince larger and larger 
audiences to accept unpalatable positions. 
Doublespeak is language that pretends to communicate but really 
doesn’t. It is language that makes the bad seem good, the negative 
appear positive, the unpleasant appear attractive or at least 
tolerable. Doublespeak is language that avoids or shifts 
responsibility, language that is at variance with its real or purported 
meaning. It is language that conceals or prevents thought; rather 
than extending thought, doublespeak limits it. 
Doublespeak is not a matter of subjects and verbs agreeing; it is a 
matter of words and facts agreeing. Basic to doublespeak is 
incongruity, the incongruity between what is said or left unsaid, 
and what really is. It is the incongruity between the word and the 
referent, between seems and be, between the essential function of 
language—communication—and what doublespeak does: mislead, 
distort, deceive, inflate, circumvent, obfuscate.204 
Often filled with “empty language”—such as “silent majority” 
and “death tax”—doublespeak is used to say one thing while 
meaning the opposite.205 Such devices especially trade “in the 
rhetoric of fear in order to manipulate the public into [a] state of 
servile political dependency and unquestioning ideological 
 
 202. A.M. Tibbetts, A Case of Confusion: The NCTE Committee on Public Doublespeak, 
40 C. ENG. 407, 410 (Dec. 1978). 
 203. Id. 
 204. LUTZ, supra note 195, at 4. 
 205. Giroux, supra note 42, at 111–12. The use of doublespeak in its specialized form of 
Newspeak is on the rise in the United States and produces “‘an impoverished vocabulary, and 
an elementary syntax . . . to limit the instruments for complex and critical reasoning.’” Id. at 
110 (citation omitted). In the past few years, “the tools of language, sound, and image are 
increasingly being appropriated in an effort to diminish the capacity of the American public to 
think critically.” Id. 
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support.”206 The most obvious purpose for the Court to use 
doublespeak in Garcetti is to diminish civil rights.207 
Doublespeak is essentially euphemistic although four distinct 
categories of doublespeak have been identified: euphemism, jargon, 
gobbledygook (bureaucratese), and inflated language.208 
Doublespeak is therefore not the prerogative of any particular 
political persuasion. The most easily identifiable doublespeak in 
Garcetti is from the first category—euphemism—as the Court 
majority attempted to supplant hitherto accepted jargon (legalese) 
with other words that mean something quite different. However, the 
majority was also not above using gobbledygook and inflated 
language to reach its result. 
The first form of doublespeak in Garcetti is the use of 
gobbledygook, or bureaucratese. Gobbledygook is incomprehensible 
language, coined by Washington, D.C. officialdom.209 Officials 
employ gobbledygook to avoid angering the electorate, and it is 
often laced with language larded by respectability and authority. 
Using gobbledygook, one vice-presidential candidate assured the 
electorate that the United States needed to support the “Star Wars” 
 
 206. Id. at 111. The use of doublespeak by administrative agencies has even prompted 
legal inquiries into their use of federal funds to propagate executive branch propaganda. See, 
e.g., Kevin R. Kosar, The Law: The Executive Branch and Propaganda: The Limits of Legal 
Restrictions, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 784 (2005); see also Cheryl L. Wade, “We Are an 
Equal Opportunity Employer”: Diversity Doublespeak, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1541 (2004) 
(analyzing the use of doublespeak by corporations to divert attention from their failure to 
attend to discrimination and racism in the workplace). 
 207. William Lutz notes: 
The clearest possible language is essential for democracy to function, for it is only 
through clear language that we have any hope of defining, debating, and deciding 
the issues of public policy that confront us. The corruption of public language—the 
language we use to discuss public affairs and to decide public policy—is the 
corruption of democracy. Doublespeak in public discourse does not help us develop, 
preserve, and advance our culture, our society, our nation. Doublespeak breeds 
cynicism, distrust, and, ultimately, hostility, the very qualities that undermine and 
destroy democracy. 
LUTZ, supra note 195, at 24–25. 
 208. WILLIAM LUTZ, DOUBLESPEAK: FROM “REVENUE ENHANCEMENT” TO 
“TERMINAL LIVING”: HOW GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, ADVERTISERS, AND OTHERS USE 
LANGUAGE TO DECEIVE YOU 2–6 (1989); see also KEITH ALLEN & KATE BURRIDGE, 
EUPHEMISM & DYSPHEMISM: LANGUAGE USED AS SHIELD AND WEAPON 201–04 (1991) 
(noting that jargon and gobbledygook/bureaucratese sometimes intersect with euphemism). 
 209. ALLEN & BURRIDGE, supra note 208, at 196; LUTZ, supra note 208, at 5. 
Interestingly, the very term “gobbledygook” was itself coined by U.S. Representative Maury 
Maverick in 1944. JOHN B. BREMNER, WORDS ON WORDS 177 (1980). 
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strategic-defense initiative with the following: “Why wouldn’t an 
enhanced deterrent, a more stable peace, a better prospect to 
denying the ones who enter conflict in the first place to have a 
reduction of offensive systems and an introduction to defensive 
capability?”210 
The Court majority used gobbledygook in such gems as: “To 
hold otherwise would be to demand permanent judicial intervention 
in the conduct of governmental operations to a degree inconsistent 
with sound principles of federalism and the separation of powers”; 
and “Ceballos’ proposed contrary rule . . . would commit state and 
federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating 
judicial oversight of communications between and among 
government employees and their superiors in the course of official 
business,” characterizing such rule as “displacement of managerial 
discretion by judicial supervision.”211 Interspersed with legalese, 
these bits of fluff are intended to appeal to the legal audience 
without saying anything legal. The Court is couching in 
gobbledygook the “principle” that courts are not competent 
anymore to judge speech issues between government employers and 
employees. Derived from no legal principle from the Pickering-
Connick historical continuity, this bureaucratese appeals to a small 
slice of political audience while its gobbledygook is intended to 
assuage the fears of the remainder of the audience that there really 
exists some legal rationale.212 
Of course, the most extraordinary use of gobbledygook is the 
majority’s evisceration of “citizen.” Although it is hard to categorize 
this procedure as bureaucratese, one is otherwise hard-pressed to 
discover the source of the corruption of that word. It now no longer 
means “in a political sense, to designate one who has the rights and 
privileges of a citizen of a state or of the United States.”213 The 
 
 210. LUTZ, supra note 208, at 5. Bureaucratese also shares, with shibboleths, the ability 
to elevate the status of the speaker with the In-Crowd. See ALLEN & BURRIDGE, supra note 
208, at 206. 
 211. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006). 
 212. Lest one should think that bureaucratese is the sole bailwick of the conservative 
persuasion, a Justice Breyer majority opinion was recently taken to task for creating a standard 
of review that consisted of gobbledygook. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 
2358 n.3 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 213. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 690 (1887). “All persons born or naturalized in 
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 
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Court now excludes public employees who are doing their jobs from 
citizenry and therefore from the First Amendment’s protection from 
the government, the very entity against whom the Bill of Rights was 
intended to protect. This odd “disjunctive” treatment leaves up in 
the air exactly when government employees are citizens and when 
they are not: when they are serving their government and other 
citizens they are not citizens, but when they are not, they can speak. 
This obfuscation of “citizen” obscures the Court’s shift away from 
the threshold inquiry about the speech itself: a matter of public 
concern or a matter of personal interest only.214 Instead, the focus is 
on the nebulous job description given by the employer to define 
whether an employee is a citizen or not. Defining free speech is now 
in the hands of the government, against whom the First Amendment 
was designed to protect citizens. Only bureaucratese could make that 
palatable. 
The second form of doublespeak used in the majority opinion is 
inflated language, making the “ordinary seem extraordinary.”215 
Inflated language is the bureaucratic equivalent of the fast-food 
industry, thereby elevating the mundane to higher status.216 Hence, a 
used car is a “pre-owned” car; when the United States attacks first—
a “preemptive strike”; a lay-off of workers—“a career alternative 
enhancement program.”217 Thus, when the Court says “managerial 
discretion,”218 it is inflating language to characterize the right of 
government supervisors to retaliate against employees doing their 
jobs. 
“Managerial discretion”219 in particular has been inflated, 
apparently co-opted from the jargon of the corporate world that the 
majority seems to want to emulate. The Court has now elevated it to 
 
U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (“Citizenship in this Nation is a part of a cooperative affair. Its citizenry 
is the country and the country is its citizenry.”). 
 214. Nahmod, supra note 87, at 573–76. 
 215. LUTZ, supra note 208, at 6–7. 
 216. See ALLEN & BURRIDGE, supra note 208, at 206. In legalese, it is called puffery. See, 
e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 939 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (accusing the Court 
of engaging in puffery). 
 217. LUTZ, supra note 208, at 6. 
 218. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006). 
 219. “Managerial discretion” is a malleable term, previously having been used by the 
Court to characterize lawful business activities, such as voluntary affirmative action hiring 
policies, see, e.g., Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n. of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519–21 
n.10 (1986), or to classify individuals as managers under the National Labor Relations Act, 
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 303 (1974) (White, J., dissenting in part). 
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some sort of sacrosanct legal status. However, “managerial 
discretion” in the corporate community itself has different meanings. 
It can mean corporate managers’ micro-management of corporate 
affairs, measured by the intersection of the corporate structure and 
the managers’ “rational responses to them that creates the zone of 
discretion.”220 It also has a more macro-management meaning by 
which corporate managers are invested “with a great deal of 
authority to pursue business strategies through diverse means, 
subject to a few important constraints.”221 Or the Court is simply 
inflating the private sector’s view of employer discretion to that of 
the government workplace, on parity with the First Amendment.222 
Ironically, the corporate world views law as one of the important 
constraints on managerial discretion,223 especially because business 
decision makers are rational perhaps only twenty percent of the 
time.224 By Garcetti, however, the Court has specifically abdicated 
the constraint of law from “managerial discretion” in the interests of 
the “latitude of managerial action.”225 Inflated language has thus 
turned the intent of “managerial discretion” on its head. 
Similarly did the majority puff up “managerial discipline”226 as a 
euphemism for the retaliatory act itself. And this third category of 
doublespeak—euphemism—is where the Court outdid itself. What 
must first be understood about the Court’s euphemisms is their 
relationship to legalese, and as jargon, the fourth type of 
 
 220. Susan Key, Perceived managerial discretion: an analysis of individual ethical 
intentions, 14 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 218, 219 (2002), available at 
www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/90118307_1.html. 
 221. Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate 
Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1387 (2007);  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True 
Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebhuck’s Solution for Improving Corporate 
America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1762–64 (2006). 
 222. BARRY, supra note 197, at 5 (“Our legal system gives employers a great deal of 
discretion to manage the workplace, including employee speech, as they see fit and imposes 
few limits on how that discretion is exercised.”). 
 223. E.g., Strine, supra note 221, at 1762–64. 
 224. James E. Holloway, A Primer on the Theory, Practice, and Pedagogy Underpinning a 
School of Thought on Law and Business, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 587, 599–600 n.45 (2005) 
(citing RICKY W. GRIFFIN, MANAGEMENT 274 (6th ed. 1999)). 
 225. Id. at 590 n.15 (citing Donald C. Hambrick & Sydney Finkelstein, Managerial 
Discretion: A Bridge Between Polar Views of Organizational Outcomes, in RESEARCH IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: AN ANNUAL SERIES OF ANALYTICAL ESSAYS AND CRITICAL 
REVIEWS 371, 371 (L.L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw eds., 1987)). 
 226. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006). 
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doublespeak.227 To the extent the legal audience agrees on and 
employs terms consistently, jargon is a legitimate use of language.228 
The specialized language of the law sometimes is the only accurate 
language available because the precision of the words chosen requires 
technical language known by and familiar to the profession.229 
Euphemistic jargon as legalese provides perfect cover for the Court 
to misuse language under the guise of introducing new technical 
terminology to be adopted by the profession. Unfortunately, these 
new “technical” terms are euphemisms in the more Orwellian sense 
than in the legal sense. 
Euphemisms are a healthy way for individuals to avoid taboo 
subjects, such as sex, death, and disease,230 but are doublespeak when 
“used to mislead or deceive.”231 As Orwell suggested, it “is designed 
to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable.”232 Hence, Nazi 
Germany’s genocide was a “final solution” and “special 
treatment,”233 and “[c]apital punishment is our society’s recognition 
of the sanctity of human life.”234 Likewise did the majority employ 
euphemisms to hide the fact that its decision was based not on any 
principled reasoning but upon the desire to protect retaliatory 
behavior by bad managers. 
Perhaps most suggestive of this effort is the opinion’s 
euphemistic use of “discipline.” “Discipline” means “[p]unishment 
intended to correct or instruct; esp., a sanction or penalty imposed 
after an official finding of misconduct.”235 In like fashion, the Court 
has interpreted “discipline” in the context of a union’s right to 
discipline its members’ rules violations as distinct from retaliation.236 
 
 227. See generally LUTZ, supra note 195, at 85–113. 
 228. LUTZ, supra note 208, at 4. 
 229. ALLEN & BURRIDGE, supra note 208, at 195–201. 
 230. Id. at 233–34. “A euphemism is used as an alternative to a dispreferred expression, 
in order to avoid possible loss of face: either one’s own face or, through giving offense, that of 
the audience, or of some third party.” Id. at 11. For instance, saying one has “passed away” is a 
euphemism for one has died. LUTZ, supra note 208, at 2; see generally ALLEN & BURRIDGE, 
supra note 208, at 153–71. 
 231. LUTZ, supra note 208, at 3; see generally ALLEN & BURRIDGE, supra note 208, at 
168–69. 
 232. Orwell, supra note 193, at 92. 
 233. ALLEN & BURRIDGE, supra note 208, at 169. 
 234. LUTZ, supra note 208, at 9. 
 235. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (8th ed. 2004). 
 236. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 92 
n.16 (1989) (“We note only that Congress’ reference to punishments typically imposed by the 
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In Garcetti, however, “discipline” is a euphemism for employer 
retaliation. For instance, despite Ceballos having done his job 
correctly, the issue before the Court was “whether the First 
Amendment protects a government employee from discipline based 
on speech made pursuant to the employee’s official duties.”237 Then, 
to make sure the audience understands that retaliation is now 
“discipline,” the opinion included the word in the holding of the 
case,238 in the phrase “managerial discipline,”239 and, lest anyone be 
confused, in closing.240 
Similar euphemisms are used as if they were legal jargon rather 
than some amorphous business jargon with little legal significance, 
such as “corrective action,”241 “employer control,”242 and 
“evaluat[e].”243 The Court’s use of euphemisms and its efforts to 
elevate them to legitimate legal jargon cannot hide the simple truth 
that the government employer in Garcetti was simply retaliating 
against a government employee244 who was doing his job as expected 
by taxpayers.245 
 
union as an entity through established procedures indicates that Congress meant ‘discipline’ to 
signify penalties applied by the union in its official capacity rather than ad hoc retaliation by 
individual union officers.” ) (emphasis added). This definition is aligned with that used by 
corporate human resources personnel: 
The purpose of discipline is to encourage employees to behave sensibly at work, 
where ‘sensible’ behavior is defined as adhering to rules and regulations. In an 
organization, rules and regulations serve about the same purpose that laws do in 
society, and discipline is called for when one of these rules or regulations is violated. 
GARY DESSLER, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 598–99 (6th ed., Prentice Hall 1994). 
 237. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 238. “We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421 
(emphasis added). 
 239. Id. at 424. 
 240. Id. at 426. 
 241. “If Ceballos’ superiors thought his memo was inflammatory or misguided, they had 
the authority to take proper corrective action.” Id. at 423. 
 242. “It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created.” Id. at 422. 
 243. Id. (“The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or write does not 
mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating [read: disciplining] his performance.”). 
 244. Perhaps what the Court majority is also doing is making “government employee” a 
dysphemism. “A dysphemism is an expression with connotations that are offensive either about 
the denotatum or to the audience, or both, and it is substituted for a neutral or euphemistic 
expression for just that reason.” ALLEN & BURRIDGE, supra note 208, at 26. 
Dysphemisms . . . are used in talking about one’s opponents, things one wishes to 
show disapproval of, and things one wishes to be seen to downgrade. They are 
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IX. THE MOTIVE 
Legal theorists have suggested that the Court’s audience is a very 
narrow one, perhaps an audience that only encompasses its own 
members.246 Similarly has it been suggested that the Court’s part in 
the constitutional dialogue is a narrow one, with very little impact on 
policy, given the confluence of other, more powerful political forces 
in play.247 However, increasingly in the past few years, the Court 
majority seems to want to be a bigger player in the policy game, not 
just the ratifier of other branches’ actions. Hence, it drafts opinions 
like Garcetti, short on constitutional dialogue but long on policy 
ramifications that infect the entirety of the government employment 
system for reasons that are distinctly corporate and in some ways 
political—to deregulate the management of government employers as 
well as to protect them from accountability to the tax-paying 
citizens. 
The past couple of decades have seen an increased interest in 
running government like corporations, hence the movement to 
privatize government operations. Unlike their private-sector 
counterparts, government employees enjoyed certain freedoms 
denied other employees, not the least of which was their First 
Amendment freedom of expression. In addition, as private-sector 
unions shrink in numbers and status, public employee unions remain 
major players in both protecting their members and in formulating 
policy. As corporate thinking infects the deliberations of the Court, 
so too do the harmful aspects of modern corporate governance 
necessarily infect its decisions. How the private sector treats its 
 
therefore characteristic of political groups and cliques talking about their opponents; 
of feminists speaking about men; and also of larrikins and macho types speaking of 
women and effete behaviors. 
Id. at 27. The effect of depriving public employees of their First Amendment rights when they 
are on task is to deprive them of their citizenship—to make them less than others. This 
patronizing position is apparent in the Court’s treatment of the dependence of employee 
speech on the employer: “Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s 
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as 
a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created.” Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added). 
 245. Contrast this result to the growing trend of protecting employees who are not doing 
their jobs because of matters of conscience. See generally James A. Sonne, Firing Thoreau: 
Conscience and At-Will Employment, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 235 (2007). 
 246. See Mark Tushnet, “Shut Up He Explained,” 95 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 912–15 
(2000). 
 247. Id.  
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employees must also be the way the public sector treats its 
employees. 
This corporate thinking includes the protectiveness that many 
American employers feel toward their nearly unchallenged power 
over their workforce, power that was granted to them by current 
employment law.248 Free expression in the workplace can challenge 
that power. Consequently, private employers embrace free expression 
in the workplace only when it is helpful in achieving “productivity, 
efficiency, and prosperity” for the company.249 Otherwise, employees 
see any corporate encouragement to express themselves as pointless 
and perhaps dangerous.250 Hence, the Garcetti opinion stands merely 
as a mirror of private corporate governance. 
Related to the private sector, corporate culture that the Court 
seems willing to adopt for government employers is its desire to pay 
increasing homage to principles of the “free market.” Unfortunately, 
these principles have had a concomitant deleterious decrease in the 
economic and social position of the American worker. Any number 
of events could have been the pivotal point when the American 
worker’s prosperity took a nose-dive—deregulation, recessions, de-
unionizing.251 But as a consequence, the interests of the American 
worker were pitted against the interests of the American consumer, 
and the American worker lost.252 So too went the fortunes of the 
American white-collar worker as it was pitted against the interests of 
the American shareholder in the 1990s.253 Consequently, as the 
corporate model influences judicial decisions, it has a particular affect 
on how the courts will treat government employees, Ceballos being 
just one of many to fall victim to the fiction that government 
interests and corporate interests are the same. 
One of the primary distinctions between corporations and 
government is that the government is not answerable to consumers 
or shareholders; it is answerable to citizens, thus making the free-
market system of governance distinctly inapplicable to government. 
This is nowhere more apparent than Ceballos’ effort to serve the 
citizens he worked for while his supervisors served a different interest 
 
 248. BARRY, supra note 197, at 192. 
 249. Id. at 193–94. 
 250. Id. at 193. 
 251. GREENHOUSE, supra note 197, at 79–80. 
 252. Id. at 79–83.  
 253. Id. at 83–87.  
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in protecting potential wrongdoing in the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department.  
The immediate as well as long-range, perhaps unintended, 
purpose of Garcetti is to stifle whistleblowers, who are often 
government employees. “[W]histleblower speech may be defined as 
that which reveals that a government official has exceeded her 
authority in violation of the public trust,”254 “exposing [that] 
official’s fault to a third party or to the public.”255 One might 
quibble with the notion that Ceballos, a deputy district attorney, was 
acting as a whistleblower when he wrote his disposition memo that 
faulted the sheriff’s department’s investigation: alternatively, he 
might have been following his ethical obligations as an attorney or 
he might simply have been performing his minimum job description. 
The latter two circumstances, of course, widen the impact of the 
Court’s new policy interpretation of employee speech. Nevertheless, 
the majority’s rationale singled out whistleblower statutes as 
alternatives to the First Amendment speech protections.256 But as 
Justice Souter pointed out, whistleblower statutes do not offer the 
comprehensive protection from employer retaliation such as Ceballos 
experienced sufficient to supplant the broader range of the First 
Amendment.257 Even when the political will has coalesced to protect 
whistleblowers after Garcetti, it has been thwarted: Congress 
recently attempted to buttress the federal whistleblower protection 
for Department of Defense contractors’ employees through the 
defense reauthorization in 2008,258 but President George W. Bush 
 
 254. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the Name 
of “Efficiency,” 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 17, 19 (1996). 
 255. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 439 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 256. Id. at 425 (majority opinion). For some, like federal employees, the pertinent 
whistleblower act may preclude an employee from pursing a First Amendment claim. Levinson, 
supra note 254, at 19 n.6. 
 257. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 439 (Souter, J., dissenting). “[T]he combined variants of 
statutory whistle-blower definitions and protections add up to a patchwork, not a showing that 
worries may be remitted to legislatures for relief.” Id. at 440. Furthermore, whistleblower 
statutes would not protect the speech of those government employees doing their job who are 
not engaged in whistle blowing. Id. Instead, the First Amendment has been the refuge for 
those whistleblowers whose respective jurisdictions’ statutes do not provide protection. E.g., 
Levinson, supra note 254, at 19–20. 
 258. 10 U.S.C. § 2409, amended by National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal 
Year 2008, H.R. 4986 § 846. Congress is still working on shoring up the Whistleblower 
Protection Act in the wake of Garcetti via the Senate’s Federal Employee Protection of 
Disclosures Act, S. 274, 110th Cong. (2008) and the House’s Whistleblower Protection 
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executed a signing statement, allowing the President to bypass this 
new amendment’s provisions.259 
Indeed, the events of the past six or seven years260 have 
influenced the policy set out in Garcetti. Garcetti will clearly have a 
greater impact on the constitutional dialogue by protecting any 
administration—but particularly the George W. Bush 
administration—from innumerable instances of government 
employees either blowing the whistle on executive branch activities 
or even just engaging in official duties that anger government 
employers. The instances of such now-sanctioned retaliation are 
rather staggering: 
 NASA management retaliated against two research pilots and 
an aviation manager after raising concerns about flight 
safety.261 
 Military defense lawyers at Guantánamo have accused the 
government of trying to intimidate them in their defense of 
clients.262 
 The Inspector General for the Department of Commerce 
retaliated against employees who assisted congressional 
investigations for misuse of funds.263 
 An FDA Commissioner threatened whistleblowers.264 
 Controversial U.S. Attorney appointments are being 
investigated.265 
 
Enhancement Act, H.R. 985, 110th Cong. (2008). As of the date of this draft, both Acts 
remain pending. 
 259. John M. Donnelly, White House Criticizes Defense Authorization Bill in Signing 
Statement, CQ TODAY, Jan. 28, 2008, at 2008 WLNR 2019654; Charlie Savage, Bush Asserts 
Authority to Bypass Defense Act, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2008, at A1. 
 260. Although this Republican administration has elevated employee intimidation and 
retaliation to an art form, it is not unique in abusing whistleblowers. See, e.g., John S. Adams, 
New Chief in Town, MISSOULA INDEP., Feb. 22, 2007, at 2007 WLNR 4567028 (U.S. Forest 
Service officials); William F. Jasper, 9/11 Security Holes Remain, NEW AMERICAN, Oct. 4, 
2004, at 2004 WNLR 5966441 (U.S. Customs officials). 
 261. David Lerman, NASA Watchdog Won’t Bow Out, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, 
Va.), June 8, 2007, 2007 WLNR 10719984. 
 262. E.g., Michael Melia, Military Lawyers Uneasy Defending Terror Suspects: 
Guantanamo Trials Spur Fears of Retribution, S. FL. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 24, 2007, at 9A; 
Guantanamo: Justice Shackled, ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2007, at 2007 WLNR 5961036. 
 263. John Solomon, Lawmakers Warn Watchdog, WASH. POST, May 14, 2007, at 2007 
WLNR 9114198; Committee Opens Investigation into Allegations of Misconduct by Commerce 
Inspector General, U.S. FED. NEWS, May 2, 2007, at 2007 WLNR 8357477. 
 264. Von Eschenbach Faces Tough Questions from House Panel, FDA WEEK, Mar. 23, 
2007, at 2007 WLNR 5507297. 
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 Department of Justice officials are allegedly impeding those 
investigations into the controversial U.S. Attorney 
appointments.266 
 Federal Aviation Administration officials retaliated against 
safety inspectors for reporting airline safety violations.267 
 National security officials have been retaliated against when: 
speaking out about prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib; disclosing 
Department of Defense intelligence problems; reporting 
misconduct in F.B.I. counterintelligence; and complaining 
about nuclear security problems.268 
 Private whistleblowers reporting corruption in the 
reconstruction of Iraq have been vilified, demoted and 
fired.269 
These events evidence just the tip of the iceberg of what is 
known and has been known concerning government misconduct and 
employees who try to report it.270 
Obviously, this ruling will affect future administrations as well, 
the immediate situations discussed above notwithstanding. It will 
also have an impact on all state and local governments and the 
service of those entities to their clients. The overarching goal of the 
 
 265. Michael Isikoff, Fuel to the Firings, NEWSWEEK, March 19, 2007, at 2007 WLNR 
4676850. 
 266. E.g., Kevin Diaz & Conrad Wilson, Watchdog Agency Says Justice Blocking Paulose 
Investigation, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Jan. 30, 2008, at 1B. 
 267. Stanley Holmes & Dean Foust, Airline Safety: A Whistleblower’s Tale, BUS. WK., 
Feb. 11, 2008, at 48. 
 268. Michael Posner, Whistleblowers Detail Retaliation for Criticizing Agencies, 
CONGRESS DAILY, Feb. 15, 2006, at 2006 WLNR 2656044; see also Jamie Sasser, Comment, 
Silenced Citizens: The Post-Garcetti Landscape for Public Sector Employees Working in National 
Security, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 759, 760–61 (2007) (opining that, of all federal employees, 
national security personnel will be most affected by the loss of First Amendment protections 
because arguably everything they do on the job is a matter of national security and thereby 
within their day-to-day official duties). 
 269. E.g., Deborah Hastings, Expose Contractor Fraud in Iraq, and You May Face 
Penalties, SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL (Charleston, S.C.), Aug. 26, 2007, at 15A; see also James 
Glanz & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Widens Fraud Inquiry into Iraq Military Supplies, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 28, 2007, at A1. It is ironic that the government supports private whistleblowers under 
certain circumstances while those who report misconduct in contracts for Iraqi reconstruction 
are treated badly. See, e.g., Ameet Sachdev, Sweet Sound of Settlement, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 
2008, at 5(1). 
 270. Eighty-one percent of the respondents in a recent survey of public sector employees 
had observed government misconduct while on the job. The private sector rated little better at 
seventy-four percent. Ed Brock, Public Sector Falls Short in Ethics Survey, AM. CITY & 
COUNTY, Feb. 1, 2007, at 8. 
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Garcetti opinion on behalf of protecting government employers is 
sowing fear in government employees. Instilling fear is, 
unfortunately, a historical reality in the American workplace.271 Being 
a whistleblower is hard enough with the laws as they existed before 
Garcetti: “To run up against the organization is to risk 
obliteration.”272 Now government employees are being told that the 
government can retaliate against them with impunity even if they are 
not whistleblowers but are simply doing their jobs. “If employees in 
the public sector are intimidated by their superiors, or if their 
superiors retaliate against them for blowing the whistle[,] . . . they 
will be reluctant to voice the expert knowledge that might help avert 
disastrous courses of action pursued by the government.”273 
X. CONCLUSION 
Drafting an opinion from a political viewpoint is a legitimate 
exercise of the bully-pulpit. The members of the Supreme Court are 
selected by the party in charge of the executive branch at that 
moment, and the back-and-forth movement of the law often reflects 
those political differences. However, drafting an opinion in service to 
authoritarianism with little other legitimate rationale strikes at the 
heart of a democratic process. Pragmatic arguments for what the law 
should be take a back seat to reaching a preordained result that has 
little legitimacy beyond the stature of the Court.  
The stature of the Court implicitly validates the use of 
pseudocommunication to reach such a preordained result: the power 
of the Court, as sender, controls the message with no opportunity 
for feedback. The Court’s control of the facts and analysis 
encourages the receiver to accept its conclusion at face value with 
little or no critical thinking, especially if the intended receiver is a 
member of the group that implicitly accepts the corporate language 
and symbolism used by the Court. This same group is susceptible to 
the emotional connections with the message and believes that the 
ends justify the means, especially if the interests of the “free market” 
 
 271. E.g., COREY ROBIN, FEAR: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL IDEA 228–29 (Oxford U. 
Press 2004). Robin posits that one of the sources of that fear is that the American workplace 
has an overabundance of supervisors compared to other industrialized countries like Japan and 
Germany. Id. at 230–32. 
 272. C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
POWER 4 (Cornell U. Press 2001). 
 273. ROBIN, supra note 271, at 230. 
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are considered a higher authority than the interests of the 
government. The means used here by the Court was to change the 
factual and legal case it had before it to create instead a rhetorical 
fantasy, a fantasy where emotional appeals to the receiver replaced 
legal analysis and authoritarian shibboleths and symbols became a 
private and unknowable source of the law. These ingredients of 
pseudocommunication infected the Garcetti decision as if the Court 
thumbed its nose at the law and reached its result “because we can.” 
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